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ABSTRACT 
This thesis illustrates why Japan should play a more important role in South 
Korea's strategic planning and policy making by demonstrating that Japan is a 
economical global power with innate aspirations of becoming a political 
superpower. This is accomplished by forecasting Japan's security policy of post- 
cold war era using a historical analysis of post world war II Japan's history, and 
augmented by a strategical analysis of three key indicators of Japan's future 
security policy: Japan's strategical environment, economical environment, and 
domestic condition. The thesis recommends that the need of cooperation between 
South Korea and Japan and ways for South Korea to cooperate with Japan. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The end of the Cold War and the relative decline of the United States' 
commitments for regional defense in the Western Pacific, makes the region's security 
very complex. Japan's emergence as an economic superpower with the existing historical 
legacies of Japanese military expansionism, intensified the complexity of the region's 
security environment. It has increased people's concern about Japan's future intentions, 
especially in terms of its security policy for the region's peace and stability. 
It seems that Japan is already acting as one of the political superpowers in world 
politics with its vast economic resources. Japanese society is moving toward becoming 
a "normal nation," which means that it becomes easier for Japan to develop its military 
capability. Japan has the capability to build up its military in a large scale. Thus, the 
future direction of Japan's security policy depends on Japanese intentions rather than 
Japan's capabilities. 
The Japanese have been very reluctant to increase their military capability even 
under the security threats from the communists bloc-mainly the Soviet Union-- during 
the Cold War era. While the Japanese attitude has moved toward right position, their 
perception of threat has decreased significantly resulting from the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Therefore, Japan's security policy will be mainly influenced by its foreign 
relations rather than by its own initiative. There is little possibility for Japan to collide 
with the United States and China. While the prospects for Japan's security relations with 
Russia are not so bright, the possibility of collision is not high, either. Thus, the future 
direction of Korean unification will significantly influence the region's security 
environment, especially Japan's security policy. 
The situation on the Korean peninsula looks very serious today because of North 
Korea's nuclear issue. But in the long run, it seems that South Korea is in a good 
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position to achieve its ultimate goal of reunification. However, there are many obstacles 
for South and North Korea to achieve that goal. Unfortunately, since the division of the 
Korean peninsula was not decided by their own will, but by foreign powers, it will be 
very difficult to unify the two Koreas into one Korea without getting all four major 
powers" cooperation. All the four powers are playing off one another and the two Koreas 
for their own national interests. Thus, if the conflicts among the four powers intensify 
around the Korean peninsula, Korea will have to face another risk of being a scapegoat 
for other big power countries' power politics. Therefore, South Korea's need for 
cooperation with the four powers—the United States, Japan, China, and Russia, becomes 
very high. Among them, China and Japan's position will be much stronger than their role 
during the Cold War era. 
Economic growth will be the main factor strengthen South Korea's position in 
dealing with unification problems and post-unification issues (i.e, to build up North 
Korea's economy to a common level). For this reason, the stability of Northeast Asia is 
a necessity for South Korea. Therefore, for South Korea or a unified Korea, the need of 
for cooperation is bigger than that of confrontation with neighboring countries. 
It seems that it will not be so difficult for South Korea or a unified Korea to 
manage its foreign relations with the United States, China, and Russia compared to 
Japan, because of the historical legacies between the Koreans and the Japanese. 
Conversely, the necessity for cooperation with Japan for South Korea's national interests 
(or a unified Korea) is bigger than that of any other country. Thus, if South Korea or a 
unified Korea could not escape from the ghosts of the past in its relations with Japan, it 
would be more harmful to South Korea or a unified Korea. 
Unification is Korea's destiny and it would be better for Japan to give its full help 
toward that goal. A Korea that is unified will be strong enough to resist any internal or 
external threats. And it will be an important factor in contributing to the stability and 
prosperity of all Northeast Asia. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
To some extent the bipolar system of the Cold War contributed to a 
lasting peace since World War II. Whether or not it was due to the fear of 
nuclear terror between the two blocs-- led by the Soviet Union and the 
United States, is debatable.1 This "long peace" reflected the realism of 
international politics, (particularly the balance of power theory) rather than 
the superiority of any idealist theory.2 The collapse of the Soviet bloc made 
possible the superpower status ascribed to the United States. As a 
consequence of this change, if we accept hegemonic theory, we can expect 
a long 'real' peace without genuine U.S-Soviet continued confrontation. 
According to Gilpin, a hegemon can maintain the stability of the system by 
providing public goods3 to states which make up the system. Hegemonic 
conflict arises from an increasing disequilibrium between the burden of 
maintaining a hegemonic position and the resources available to the 
dominant power to perform this task.4 In this context, is the United States 
a real hegemonic power? It is undeniable that the United States is still a 
superpower, however, many people doubt the capability and will of the 
United States to be a hegemonic power. There are many parts of the world 
which cannot be controlled by the United States for its own interests. 
Examples are the nuclear capabilities of the former Soviet Republics, and 
the economic powers of the Europen Community and Japan. Moreover, the 
cost of continuing Pax-Americana and the cost of providing other countries 
with 'public goods' does not make the achievement of a Pax-Americana 
highly probable. This, in turn, increases the uncertainties of this era created 
by the victory of the United States over the Soviet bloc. 
One of the key characteristics of these uncertainties is regionalization 
of world politics. As the confrontation between the two superpowers ended, 
the possibility of conflicts on a global dimension decreased significantly, but 
the probability of regional conflicts caused by ethnic difference, historical 
animosity, and even emotional conflicts, freed from the restraints of the 
Cold War, between and among local countries increased. The Gulf War, the 
Somalia and Rwanda disasters, and war in Bosnia support this argument. In 
turn, the responsibility of regional organizations and regional states to solve 
regional conflicts increases significantly.5 
Another characteristic of the end of the Cold War is the increasing 
influence of economic power in world politics. Relative economic 
performance was obviously a key factor in the end of the Cold War. The 
inefficiency of the Soviet Union's economy could not support its militarized 
and ideology-oriented communist regime. As a result of this, many countries 
have focused on developing their economies rather than emphasizing on 
ideology and a military build up. The influence of economic superpowers, 
like Japan and Germany, on world politics has increased significantly. Some 
people do not hesitate to suggest that the real winner of the Cold War was 
not the United States, but Japan and Germany, which emerged as the new 
economic superpowers. Another aspect of the world economy is increased 
interdependence. While increased interdependence of the global economy 
can contribute to cooperation among nations, different styles of capitalism 
can also be another conflicting factor between nations or economic blocs. 
There were many positive movements in Northeast Asia as a result of 
the end of the Cold War. Diplomatic relations between South Korea and the 
Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China were normalized in 1990 
and 1992, respectively. As a response to those movements, talks toward the 
normalization of diplomatic ties between North Korea and Japan started just 
after the normalization of relations between South Korea and the Soviet 
Union. North Korea also used the nuclear issue as an opportunity to open 
talks with the United States about diplomatic normalization. Also, there are 
some movements to stimulate military security and economic cooperation, 
such as ASEAN-PMC, security forums which Japan and the former Soviet 
Union suggested, APEC, and the Tumen River Area Development Program. 
Although the global dimension of the Cold War ended in Northeast 
Asia, there are still remnants of the Cold War in the region. North and 
South Korea still confront each other on the Korean Peninsula which has 
been one of the most dangerous theaters during the Cold War era. 
Moreover, the tension is worsened by the threat of North Korean nuclear 
proliferation. The dispute over the Kuril Islands remains an unresolved issue 
between Japan and Russia. Even if the North Korean nuclear issue, and 
unification of the two Koreas were resolved within a democratic society and 
market economy framework, great potential still exist to create destabilizing 
regional conflict, such as historical animosities between Korea, China, and 
Japan. 
The picture of Northeast Asia is rapidly changing from that of the 
Cold War era. As the influence of the two superpowers lessen in the 
region, regional states' influence is increasing significantly. China, Japan, 
and the two Koreas are becoming key players in their own terms. One of the 
prominent features of this changing era in the region is the emerging role of 
Japan.  The nuclear issue of North Korea has been the main problem for the 
peace and stability of the region since North Korea threatened to withdraw 
from the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty. A main reason for the United 
States, China, and South Korea to respond so sensitively about North 
Korea's nuclear option is concern for Japan's future position. Nobody wants 
to give Japan a pretext for building nuclear arms. In turn, many 
governments are questioning Japan's future role in political and military 
dimensions. While people do not hesitate to say that Japan is an economic 
hegemon in the region, doubt exists regarding the feasibility of Japan's 
military and political hegemonic power. Because China and Korea have 
bitter experiences of Japan's military expansionism prior to the end of the 
World War II, they are extremely sensitive about Japan's strategies, 
especially its military movements. Nevertheless, as the presence of the 
United States military lessens, it may be natural for Japan to build up and 
improve its military posture. In fact, there are considerable debates within 
Japan about whether to become a "normal" nation in terms of national 
defense and foreign policy. Even though Japan has no intention of 
threatening its neighbors by improving its military power, to the Asian 
nations which suffered bitter experiences during the World War II, it may 
still be considered a great threat—"a security dilemma." 
The future of the Korean Peninsula also has the possibility to 
exacerbate this security dilemma in the region. If we assume that Korea will 
unify in one or two decades, a "unified Korea" with a military force of 
perhaps 1.7 million troops, and growing economic power will be very 
threatening to Japan's sense of its national security. 
With this context as the basis of my thesis, I will examine the trends 
of Japan's security policy since the end of the World War II, investigate the 
prospects for the future of Japan's security policy, and explore plausible 
alternatives for South Korea or a unified Korea. As the result of this 
analysis, I will suggest possibilities for cooperation in security terms 
between South Korea (or a unified Korea) and Japan, survey the possibilities 
of a Korean-Japanese entente. 
II. TRENDS IN JAPAN'S SECURITY POLICY 
FROM 1945 TO 1990 
A.DEVELOPMENTS OF POST-WAR SECURITY POLICY 
1.Forming Postwar National Strategy (1945-1960) 
a. The Yoshida Doctrine (1945-1954) 
Defeated in World War II, Japan, like its ally Germany, was 
forced to confront the humiliation of occupation by foreign troops. But for 
Japan there was an important difference. While the occupation was 
theoretically an "allied" affair through the eleven member Far Eastern 
Commission, in actuality it was exclusively American.6 The country would 
not be partitioned into Communist and non-Communist sectors and there 
would be no zones of occupation, each controlled by troops from a different 
country. Not only were the military elements of the occupation entirely from 
the United States, but the determination of policy was kept as a closely 
guarded, American prerogative. In the event of differences of opinion 
among the allies, the operating principle was the policy of the United States 
would govern.7 
During World War II, U.S. policy on Asia focused on checking 
Japan's expansionism. In line with this, the United States tried to induce the 
Soviet Union into war against Japan, and to support China in increasing its 
capability to resist Japan. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor made the 
United States and China true allies. American policy with regard to China, 
as defined by Secretary of State Hull, came to be directed toward two goals: 
to insure China could remain effective in her fight against Japan, and to 
raise China to great power status so that she might serve as a stabilizing 
influence in postwar Asia.8 Immediately following World War II, American 
foreign policy turned to the task of creating a peaceful environment in East 
Asia based on its idealist position strengthened by the postwar public 
sentiment. Plans were made for the reorientation of Japan's political and 
economic systems so that she could become a peace-loving and prosperous 
contributor to regional and global stability. In China, the opposing factions 
were to be reconciled to form an effective coalition government, enabling 
a strong, united and democratic China to take her place as a major world 
power and guarantor of Asian stability. Korea, as promised at the Cairo 
Conference, was to become free and independent, "in due course," through 
national self-determination. 
The direction of occupation policy, in broad outline, had been set 
forth in the Posdtam Declaration in July 1945 by the United States, Britain, 
and China. The declaration called for the removal of those responsible for 
the war and punishment of war criminals. The structure of the economy 
would be transformed to prevent rearmament and allow for the payment of 
reparations. Democratic values would be instilled and imperialist ways 
abolished. Japan would lose its overseas possessions, limiting its sovereignty 
to the four main islands plus some minor ones.9 
In line with this, an American-led Supreme Commander of Allied 
Powers (SCAP) implemented this policy under the strong personal influence 
of General MacArthur. Once in place, the first objective of the occupation, 
and the most immediate, was the demobilization of the Japanese armed 
forces. This meant bringing approximately six and a half million soldiers 
and other personnel back from the many battle grounds, disposing of their 
weapons, and finding some sort of employment for them and reintegrating 
them into society. Related to the repatriation and demobilization of troops 
was the dismantling of the organizational structure of the military, which 
formed the basis of government and politics. 
To ensure that Japan's authoritarian and imperial past would not 
be repeated, a greater concern for civil liberties and human values was to 
be instilled into the population. Further, procedures were to be found that 
would promote such an attitude in every day practice. This goal was closely 
tied to reforms in education. Conversion from war production to a peacetime 
economy occasioned policy disputes among the authorities and hardship for 
the people. Munitions industries were dismantled or converted. Several 
plans were developed to deal with the zaibatsu issue. 
As a result of this policy, the empire was dismembered and all 
Japanese abroad, soldiers and civilians alike, were returned to Japan. The 
military services were demobilized; paramilitary and Ultranationalist 
organizations were dissolved. States sponsored Shinto ceremonies was 
disestablished. Armaments industries were dismantled. The Home ministry 
was abolished. The police were decentralized, their powers curtailed, and 
their authority to regulate speech and thought revoked. Political prisoners 
were released from jail.10 
The Occupation took action to remove the old leadership, too. 
The position of the Emperor was changed. Formerly sacred as well as 
sovereign, he was stripped of all "powers related to government" to become 
the "symbol of the state and of the unity of the people, deriving his position 
from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power." Top 
Japanese government officials held responsible for the war and for crimes 
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against humanity were tried by the International Military Tribunal for the 
Far East. Seven of those, including General Tojo, were hanged in December 
1948, and sixteen were sentenced to life in prison. Several thousand lower 
ranking personnel also confronted postwar justice and many were executed. 
In addition to those war criminals, a second group of people was 
identified to be purged from government service. A list was prepared of 
220,000 persons to be removed from office and barred from holding any 
future position, of whom 190,000 were military officers.11 
In general, the occupation policy produced the desired effect. The 
Japanese no longer had the means or the will to take up arms, either for 
attack or for defense.12 However, the reforms had intrinsic limits resulting 
from the fact that the reforms were forced by outsiders. 
The Occupation declared its intention to democratize and reform 
the bureaucracy. But this effort was constrained by, among other things, the 
inability of Americans to govern Japan utilizing their own resources. As a 
practical matter, it was necessary to work through the existing Japanese 
bureaucracy. In fact, even before the end of the war, MacArthur had 
envisaged "maximum utilization of existing Japanese governmental agencies 
and   organizations."13   This   dependence   proved   a   major   barrier   to   a 
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complete and effective purge of right-wing elements in the government and 
economy. Many of the former top officials in the previous government 
escaped the purging process. When concern for the threat from the left 
replaced worries over revived militarism, the old conservative elite was 
rehabilitated and wartime sins forgiven, or at least ignored. Ultimately the 
occupation failed to reduce the power of the bureaucracy or to make it more 
politically responsible to the people. 
Despite strong opposition from several quarters, the Emperor was 
retained. Because, in a gesture marked by foresight and imagination, the 
greater symbolic value of the Emperor for Japanese pride and the need to 
gain their cooperation was recognized. Hard-liners in the Occupation 
opposed the retention of the imperial institution, maintaining that the 
Japanese would never understand and practice democracy so long as any 
vestige of the emperor-based system remained. 
Even though several plans were executed to deal with the zaibatsu 
issue, the breakup of the zaibatsu was essentially a failure. Even prior to the 
end of the war, the business community took measures to protect itself from 
blame for starting the war and for losing it. The occupation could not 
overcome the resistance and foot-dragging by Japanese government and 
12 
business, which were more comfortable with a hierarchically structure 
system of industrial organization than with "industrial democracy."14 Many 
of the old political and economic elites survived. Moreover, by the late 
1940s opposition to the idea of crushing the zaibatsu was growing within the 
American business community, that combined its economic interests with the 
changing situation of the evolving cold war. In the end the zaibatsu, which 
were family-based holding companies, were simply replaced by keiretsu, 
networks of companies held together by common linkages to banks and 
trading companies.15 
Despite some limits of the reform, the success of the occupation's 
efforts to shift Japan from war-like state to a "peace loving state" resulted 
in the creation of the so-called Peace Constitution in 1947. When the 
Japanese government came up in February 1946 with what MacArthur felt 
to be unsatisfactory proposals for constitutional reform, he had his own staff 
quickly draft an entirely new document, originally in English. After only 
slight modifications by the Japanese cabinet, this was presented to the Diet 
as the Emperor's amendment to the 1889 constitution. It was passed by this 
body with only slight alterations, and went into effect on May 3, 1947. 
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The new constitution reflected much of Western democratic 
political philosophy. The new constitution made two basic changes in 
Japan's political structure. One brought the theory of the Emperor's position 
into line with reality by transferring his "sovereignty" to the Japanese people 
and by making it absolutely clear that he was merely "the symbol of the 
State and of the unity of the people", and had no political powers 
whatsoever.16 Now, it became impossible for Japanese politics to be 
controlled by a small group in the name of the emperor, like had often been 
done prior to the end of World War II. 
The other major change in the constitution was its   unequivocal 
establishment of a British-style parliamentary system. The constitution made 
explicit the supremacy of the House of Representatives which has to rely 
closely   on   the  people's   will.17  Above  all,   the   Occupation's   goal   of 
demilitarizing Japan was achieved in Chapter II, Article 9 of the new 
constitution, which called for the permanent renunciation of war. 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and 
order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign 
right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of 
settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim 
of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces as well as 
other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of 
belligerency of the state will not be recognized. 
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The Occupation operated on the premise that Japan was the 
principal threat to the tranquility of the Far East. It was assumed that if 
Japan's military power were destroyed, Japan and its neighbors would live 
in peace. There would be no aggressors, and therefore no need for defense. 
If the peace of the Far East were somehow to be threatened again, the new 
United Nations would protect it.18 
However, as the Cold War evolved in Europe and the 
communist's threat became obvious in Asia, U.S. policy toward Asia 
changed rapidly. The Western powers and the Soviet Union failed to reach 
an agreement on the four-power administration of Germany at the Moscow 
Conference in 1947, despite more than two years of unsuccessful efforts to 
fulfill the wartime agreements of Cairo, Yalta, and Posdtam. As such, the 
conference marked a turning point in relations between the United States and 
the U.S.S.R., and the beginning of a new American policy to contain the 
Soviet Union and other Communist states within their existing borders. This 
"containment policy" can be summed up that the U.S. tried to protect the 
free world from becoming communist by tying its allies together through 
collective and bilateral agreements led by the United States, and assisting 
them to increase their own power to defend themselves from internal and 
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external communist threats. This containment policy of the United States 
resulted in the North Atlantic Trety of Organization(NATO) and the 
Marshall Plan in Europe. 
As the conflict between the nationalists and the communists 
deepened in China, the whole picture of East Asia changed fundamentally. 
It was believed that the amount of required assistance to establish "free" 
China was more than the U.S. government was willing to provide, and 
confidence in Chiang Kai Shek's ability to govern, even with substantial 
American aid, was extremely low. As a result, the United States resolved 
not to become directly involved in the Chinese civil war,19 and the 
Chinese communists came to power in October, 1949. 
The U.S. response to these developments was well expressed in 
the statement of Secretary of State Dean Acheson on January 12, 1950. He 
defined America's defensive perimeters as stopping west of a line running 
through the Aleutian Islands, Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, and the 
Philippines. Notably, this line omitted Formosa, to where the Nationalist 
Chinese government had just retreated after having been driven off the 
Chinese mainland by the Communists, and South Korea, where war was 
only months away.20 
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As a result of these developments, the United States decided to 
use Japan, the defeated enemy, to replace China in the American security 
scheme for East Asia, and to build her up to serve as the kingpin to overall 
Asian stability and security. 
Japan's domestic situation also contributed to the shift of U.S. 
policy from reform to recovery. Production in 1947 was only 37 per cent 
of the prewar level.21 The effect of labor reform resulted in the best 
conditions for communist revolution. Predictions about Japan's future were 
uniformly pessimistic. The awful poverty of the early post-war years was no 
basis for a stable, parliamentary democracy. 
In line with this analysis, several economic and social reforms 
changed their courses and even reversed their courses. The Dodge Plan, 
introduced in 1948, called for deflationary measures intended to make Japan 
economically self-sufficient by 1953. Big business was back in favor because 
of the advantages of "economies of scale." In 1949, earlier labor reform 
laws were revised and a more restrictive Taft-Hartley type of legislation was 
passed.22 
This bad condition also strongly influenced General MacArthur 
to initiate his efforts for an early peace settlement in 1947. He seemed to 
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believe that an extended occupation would produce bitter anti-American 
feeling in Japan, and Japan's bad economy was becoming a burden on the 
American tax payers. Therefore, he insisted, the only way to solve this 
problem was the conclusion of a peace treaty at the earliest possible date—a 
treaty that would end the blockade and readmit Japan to world trade.23 In 
security terms, he desired to see Japan become the Switzerland of the Far 
East, and if Japan's security was threatened, the United Nations could 
provide Japan with its security guarantee. 
Yet, the position of the U.S. government was much different not 
only from that of General MacArthur, but also controversial among the 
different players in Washington. Within the State Department, a committee 
headed by Dr. Hugh Borton was drafting a peace treaty under instructions 
from Secretary of State James Byrnes. This draft treaty was intended to 
make possible a United States-Soviet agreement on Japan. It forbade Japan 
to rearm for twenty-five years, and placed the Japanese Government and 
economy under Allied supervision and surveillance. Moving on an entirely 
different tack was Mr. George Kennan, who was at the time establishing the 
Policy Planning Staff to formulate cold war strategy. The Policy Planning 
Staff was preoccupied with European situations, but it was implicit in Mr. 
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Kennarfs view that cooperation with the Soviets was unlikely, and that 
American policy should be to prevent Japan from falling under Soviet 
control. Rather than conclude an early peace and end the Occupation, the 
War Department preferred to continue the Occupation in order to give the 
United States the greatest possible freedom in using Japan as a base for 
military operations in the Far East.24 
The Japanese cabinet under Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, 
initially intended to seek security guarantees from the United States, the 
Soviet Union, Great Britain, and China, and to declare Japan's permanent 
neutrality. This was a little more realistic position than that of the 
Occupation authorities.25 As the rivalry between the United States and the 
Soviet Union grew, Japanese leadership felt that there was no way for Japan 
to provide for defense against foreign invasion and to protect her 
independence, except by an alliance with a third power—the United States. 
Before a peace treaty initiative surfaced from General Mac Arthur, 
Prime Minister Yoshida with Foreign Minister Ashida were already prepared 
for this initiative. If the major powers—the United States and the Soviet 
Union- had agreed to cooperate in ruling over Japan as in Germany, it 
would have been fateful for the sovereignty of Japan and the rebuilding of 
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its self-respect. And if they agreed with making Japan the Switzerland of 
the Far East, it would have been very vulnerable to foreign threats 
especially from the Soviet Union which already occupied the "Northern 
Terrotories." The Soviet Union's declaration of war against Japan in August 
1945, in disregard of the neutrality pact still in effect between them 
deepened Japanese doubts on the efficacy of neutrality as a means of 
providing for Japan's future security. And it seemed that conflicts betwen 
the United States and the Soviet Union were inevitable. They assumed that 
if the superpowers were to become rivals, they would need allies. Allies, 
however dependent and vulnerable, possess a certain value. They hoped that 
the Japanese government could translate that value into bargaining power, 
which in turn would give to Japan a measure of independence. 
Then, who was more suitable for the ally of Japan? The choice of 
the United States as an ally was almost a forgone conclusion. Not only were 
American troops occupying Japan, but Mr. Yoshida and Mr. Ashida had 
been opposed all through the 1930s to war against the United States. This 
opposition, which resulted in their leaving the Government several years 
before the Pearl Harbor, was not entirely a matter of ideology. It stemmed 
from their strategic view, which was that the United States was Japan's most 
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dangerous enemy and most desirable ally-that the success of Japan's policy 
on the Asian Continent, and that safety of the Empire, depended not simply 
on avoiding war with the United States but on cooperation with it. 
Following the Pacific War, this view was more applicable than 
ever. To Mr. Yoshida and Mr. Ashida, it seemed obvious that American 
naval and air power could protect Japan from the Soviet Union and ensure 
its access to world trade. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, although 
occupying the northern islands within sight of Hokkaido and posing a real 
threat to Japan's security, appeared to be a continental land power, incapable 
of protecting the Japanese islands against the United Sates or ensuring Japan 
the means of economic survival. Moreover, the Soviet Union did not 
occupy Japan. Unlike those taken by other allied forces, the prisoners taken 
by the Soviet Union were not promptly repatriated to Japan. When they 
reached Japan in the spring of 1947, the intentions of the Soviet Union 
became obvious. They tried to swing Japan into the Soviet orbit, if not by 
direct attack, then by an internal communist take over. 
Japanese leadership thought that an 'external threat' could be 
repelled by the guarantee of the ally's power. But regarding 'internal' 
threats, such as a radical revolution, they thought that if they depended on 
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the United States forces to protect them against internal threat, it would be 
impossible to seek Japan's sovereignty. Thereby they concluded that they 
had to have a national police to protect the Government from being taken 
over by the communists. As a result of this analysis, Yoshida tried to a 
finish peace treaty with the United States in their own terms as early as 
possible, and he had insisted upon building a nation-wide police. But the 
U.S. Government and General MacArthur had agreed with the former, but 
refused to allow the latter. 
After the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine, and after the 
Korean War broke out, the Cold War developed rapidly in Asia, too. This 
Cold War rivalry offered Japan both dangers and opportunities. The dangers 
were that Japan would be drawn into the Cold War politics, expend its 
limited and precious resources on remilitarization, and postpone the full 
economic and social recovery of the Japanese people. Conversely, Soviet- 
U.S. rivalry offered certain opportunities. The Cold War made Japan 
strategically important to the United States and gave Yoshida bargaining 
leverage. He reasoned that Japan could make minimal concessions of passive 
cooperation with the Americans in turn for an early end of the Occupation, 
a  long-term guarantee of its  national  security,  and  the opportunity  to 
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concentrate on all-out economic recovery. 
In the early 1950s, in accord with the principles of the 
containment policy, the State Department of the United States tried to 
establish a regional security organization similar to NATO in the Pacific that 
would facilitate Japanese rearmament but keep it under international control. 
John Foster Dulles, special emissary of the Secretary of State, insisted upon 
Japan's rearmament as a precondition before the end of the occupation.26 
While Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru insisted on creating a 
nation wide police, he was opposed to Japan's massive rearmament and to 
Japan's entry into a regional collective security system. Prime Minister 
Yoshida was unwilling to participate in such a multilateral Pacific security 
system, which, he realized earlier, would draw Japan into the Cold War 
politics. Instead, Yoshida contrived to trade bases on Japanese soil for a 
U.S. guarantee of Japanese security and keep Japan as lightly armed as 
possible so that the nation could concentrate all its energies on economic 
growth and social development. But regarding internal threats, such as a 
radical revolution, he thought that if Japan depends on the United States for 
internal security, it will be impossible to seek Japan's sovereignty. He 
suggested that Japan could protect itself through its own devices by being 
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democratic and peaceful and by relying on the protection of world opin.on. 
He argued, Japan had a constitution, that was inspired by American ideals 
and the lessons of defeat, that it renounced arms, and that the Japanese 
people were determined to uphold these principles and to adhere to a new 
course in world affairs. He even manipulated Socialist party leaders to whip 
up anti-rearmament demonstrations, during Dulles's visits.27 He further 
pointed out to Dulles the fears that other Asian countries had of a revived 
Japanese military. 
Kenneth B. Pyle summed up this Japanese response, the so called 
Yoshida Doctrine, as follows: 
1. Japan's economic rehabilitation must be the prime national goal 
Political-economic cooperation with the United States was necessary 
tor this purpose. 
2. Japan should remain lightly armed and avoid involvement in 
international political-strategic issues. Not only would this low 
posture free the energies of its people for productive industrial 
development, it would also avoid divisive internal struggles-what 
Yoshida called "a thirty-eighth parallel" in the hearts of the Japanese 
people. v 
3. To gain a long-term guarantee for its own security, Japan would 
provide bases for the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force.28 
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Yoshida himself confided his intention in 1952 to an attentive 
young aide, 
The day [for rearmament] will come naturally when our 
livelihood recovers. It may sound devious, but let the 
Americans handle[our security] until then. It is indeed our 
Heaven-bestowed good fortune that the Constitution bans arms. 
If the Americans complain, the Constitution gives us a perfect 
justification. The politicians who want to amend it are fools.29 
The young aide to whom Yoshida confided these views was Kiichi 
Miyazawa, who had served as the last Prime Minister from the Liberal 
Democratic Party, from November 1991 to August 1993. It is clear that 
minimum defense and refusal to be involved in collective security are the 
two basics of security policy in the Yoshida Doctrine. 
When General MacArthur authorized the formation of a 75,000 
man National Police Reserve force to replace his U.S. forces which moved 
to Korea to repel North Korea's invasion, Prime Minister Yoshida was 
doubly relieved by this decision. It provided a solution to the internal 
security problem, and he hoped it would be a good way out of Dulles' 
request for rearmament.30 Prime Minister Yoshida did not achieve his goal 
fully when the Security Treaty was signed between the United States and 
Japan, September 8,1951. He gained the independence of Japan and the 
United States' security guarantee for Japan without forcing it to be involved 
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into regional security problems, but he had to pay for it. 
The Security Treaty between the United States and Japan was 
highly unequal, preserved many of the Occupation prerogatives of the U.S. 
military, and in effect rendered Japan a military satellite of the United 
States. In addition to granting bases to the United States, it gave the United 
States a veto over any third country's military presence in Japan, the right 
to intervene to quell domestic disorder in Japan,31 the right to project 
military power from bases in Japan against a third country without 
consulting Japan, and an indefinite time period for the treaty. In addition, 
the United States insisted on extraterritorial legal rights for its military and 
dependents. At the same time, Yoshida was compelled to recognize Taiwan 
as the legitimate government of China and thus forswear normal relations 
with the mainland government.32 Moreover, it became more difficult for 
Japan to recover its Northern Islands from the Soviet Union. 
However, Yoshida's firmness spared Japan military involvement 
in the Korean War and allowed it instead to profit enormously from the 
United States' procurement orders. Yoshida privately called the resulting 
stimulus to the economy "a gift of the gods." More such gifts appeared over 
the next decades. 
26 
Since the conclusion of the Security Treaty with the United States 
in 1951, Japan's security policy has been maintained based on the Yoshida 
doctrine. The United States has consistently pressured Japan to increase its 
military capability to meet regional security problem and to share the burden 
of the United States in the Far East. However, minimum defense spending 
and avoiding collective security involvement have been the Japanese 
response to the U.S. pressures. 
Yoshida grudgingly agreed to upgrade the National Police 
Reserve, which Mac Arthur established in July 1950 with 75,000 men, to the 
status of national security force in January 1952 with 110,000 men under the 
pressure of the United States during the peace treaty negotiations. 
Nevertheless, U.S. pressure on Japan to participate more actively in its 
alliance system resumed shortly after the signing of the Peace and Security 
Treaty in September 1951. In October 1951, Congress passed the Mutual 
Security Assistance(MSA) act, which was designed to consolidate the 
American alliance system through supplying military equipment including 
training program and inducing active cooperation of allied powers. In line 
with this, the United States pressed Japan to accept military aid for a 
threefold expansion of its forces from 110,000 men National Security Force 
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to an army of 350,000 men. But after three years of negotiations, the MSA 
agreement that Japan and the United States signed in March 1954, while 
acknowledging that "Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for 
its own defense, emphasized that Japan can only contribute to the extent 
permitted by its general economic conditions, and acknowledged that the 
present agreement will be implemented by each government in accordance 
with the constitutional provisions of the respective countries." In the month 
the MSA agreement was signed, the Japanese government, complying with 
the demands brought by Washington in connection with the MSA agreement, 
introduced legislation to reorganize and to expand the armed forces, 
including an air force. Even while providing the legal bases of Japan's 
subsequent military organization, Yoshida was able to temper U.S. demands 
in significant ways. 
In 1954, the Defense Agency Establishment Law and the Self- 
Defense Forces Law created the National Defense AgQncy(Boeicho) with 
responsibility for ground, maritime, and air self-defense forces with a total 
of 152,000 men—substantially less than half of what the United States had 
demanded. Moreover, the upper house of the Diet at the same time passed 
the unanimous resolution opposing their dispatch of forces overseas on 
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constitutional and other grounds, a position the government had previously 
asserted on many occasions in the Diet.13 
b. Anti-Yoshida Line (1955-1960) 
After Yoshida was replaced by conservative opponents who were, 
frankly, political nationalists, and who chafed at his economic-first policies, 
the Japanese government's approach to foreign and security policy was 
wholly different from that of Yoshida. They wanted to revise the 
constitution, to carry out a forthright rearmament, to negotiate a more equal 
security treaty with the United States, and generally pursue a more 
autonomous and independent course. 
This agenda, which could have succeeded in 1950 if Yoshida had 
supported it, encountered greater obstacles in the latter half of the 1950s. 
The left wing of the Japan Socialist Party(JSP) was now firmly in control of 
the party and passionately committed to an ideological defense of the 
constitution and a neutralist foreign policy. In addition, their efforts to 
negotiate with the Soviet Union to achieve a peace treaty made Washington 
suspicious of Tokyo's independent course.34 In any case, the JSP had 
gained sufficient strength in the Diet, and its hold on public opinion through 
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the media, intellectuals, and the unions made constitutional revision much 
more difficult. 
However, their efforts to increase military capabilities got the 
approval of the Diet for a National Defense Council in 1956. It established 
a Basic National Defense Policy and the First Defense Buildup Plan which 
went into effect in 1957 and was to be completed in 1960. The basic policy 
reads: 
The goal of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect 
aggression in the future; and if by chance aggression occurs, to 
repel it; and thereby to preserve our country's independence 
and peace which takes as its basis the principles of democracy. 
To achieve this goal, the basic policy is as follows: 
1. To support the action of the United Nations, to promote 
international cooperation, and to achieve world peace. 
2. To firmly establish the necessary basis to stabilize people's 
livelihood, increase their patriotism, and guarantee the security 
of the state. 
3. To gradually build up effective forces to provide the 
minimum degree of defense necessary in accord with national 
strength and national sentiment. 
4. Until the United Nations is able to acquire the ability to 
effectively stop external aggression, to deal with it on the basis 
of the security system with the United States.35 
Moreover, their efforts to achieve a much more equal treaty with 
the United States resulted in the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security 
between the United States and Japan signed in Washington D.C., on January 
19, 1960. Ironically, this treaty, which was achieved by Yoshida's political 
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opponents, embodies virtually all of Yoshida's ideas. Japan got the explicit 
guarantee of the United States for the external threats and recovered the 
residual sovereignty of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands. But Japan had the 
responsibility to defend only the territories under her administration. It 
meant that the United States had the whole responsibility for the defense of 
Japan from any external threat, however, Japan had no obligation to 
cooperate with the United States for defense beyond the territories under the 
administration of Japan.36 And Japan got some degree of control over the 
United States forces in Japan through the form of consultation.37 The 
United States was granted the use of bases in Japan in exchange of the 
security guarantee.38 Thus, the Treaty is not a "mutual" treaty of security 
cooperation in the fullest sense. 
2. Institutionalization of the Yoshida Doctrine(1960-1972) 
Under the next two prime ministers, Ikeda Hayato( 1960-1964), and 
Sato Eisaku(l 964-1972), both closely associated with Yoshida, the Yoshida 
Strategy was institutionalized and consolidated into a national consensus. 
Ikeda, who had been Yoshida's key economic adviser, finance minister, and 
a key negotiator in MSA agreement with the United States, suppressed the 
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divisive   issues  of political   nationalism  and  instead  adopted  a  political 
strategy  of low  posture  toward  the  Socialists,   with  the     intention  of 
establishing political stability and policies of managed economic growth. 
A fully self-reliant buildup of our Self-Defense Forces is our 
present duty as an independent country, but, of course, it must 
correspond    to    our    national    strength    and    to    national 
conditions , I firmly believe that our country has the lowest 
defense expenditures in the world today with which it has been 
able to maintain peace and security and the remarkable 
economic development that is the foundation of the successive 
conservative party administration.39 
This was the Prime Minister Ikeda's view of the world in his first major 
policy speech to Diet. Thus, Ikeda followed the Yoshida Doctrine- 
economics first—faithfully. Ikeda's efforts resulted in formulating a plan for 
doubling the national income within a decade. This plan was part of a 
systematic and well coordinated effort to formulate policies that would steer 
clear of ideology, raise living standards, and improve social overhead 
capital. It added up to an exclusive concentration on issues of economic 
nationalism on which the Liberal Democratic Party, the bureaucracy, the 
political opposition, and the populace generally could achieve substantial 
agreement. Almost imperceptibly the appeal of the political Left was 
coopted. and the country settled down to a long period of enthusiastic 
pursuit of high growth policies. 
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As the principal negotiator under Prime Minister Yoshida for 
moderate defense levels and as one who proclaimed its success in terms of 
economic and military effectiveness, Ikeda was not one to endorse any 
greatly increased rearmament. Japan's rearmament was really only the 
minimum necessary to satisfy the United States so that it could be induced 
to provide protection if Japan was threatened by external attack. As the Cold 
War deepened with the advent of the Cuban missile crisis, and the successful 
test of a Chinese nuclear weapon, the United States increased its pressure 
on Japan to step up its military capability, but Ikeda did not stray from 
Yoshida's prescription. 
Ikeda did give verbal support to the United States' struggle with 
global Communism in his speeches, which were sympathetic to the 
American position. However, he not only let the hard-won right of 
consultation under the Security Consultative Committee almost lapse in 
order to avoid attracting the criticism of the opponents to the 1960 Security 
Treaty, but also permitted a year's hiatus to intervene before pushing 
through the Second Defense Buildup Plan. Moreover, the Second Defense 
Buildup Plan focused on improving the quality of the forces rather on 
increasing the quantity of forces. The mission of these defense forces was 
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also severely restricted by the refusal to even countenance any participation 
in direct military operations outside Japan. Ikeda also failed to respond to 
America's overtures to join the anti-Communist crusade against Communist 
China, and to improve its relations with South Korea.40 
Under another Yoshida protege, Sato Eisaku, who succeeded Ikeda 
and held the prime ministership longer( 1964-1972) than any other individual 
in Japanese history, further elaborated the Yoshida Doctrine in terms of 
nuclear-strategic issues. Sato enunciated the three nonnuclear principles on 
December 11, 1967, which helped to calm pacifist fears aroused by China's 
nuclear experiments and the escalation of war in Vietnam. The three 
principles held that Japan would not produce, possess, or permit the 
introduction of nuclear weapons onto its soil. Least the principles be 
regarded as unconditional, Sato clarified matters in a Diet speech the 
following year in which he described the four pillars of Japan's nonnuclear 
policy: (1) reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, (2) the three nonnuclear 
principles, (3) promotion of worldwide disarmament, and (4) development 
of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.41 In 1967 the principles of 
restraining arms exports to certain countries(Communist countries, countries 
to which arms export is prohibited by UN Resolutions,  and countries 
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engaged in, or likely to be engaged in, an international conflict) were 
announced by Sato. This restraint was strengthened in 1976 to the extent 
virtually prohibiting the export to any country of weapons or installations 
pertaining to the production of weapons.42 
Moreover, Sato had rejected American pressure to increase 
Japanese contributions to Asian security. During the Nixon administration 
the issue was raised strongly of Japan's role in the collective security of 
Asia in connection with the possible return of Okinawa and more broadly 
the Nixon Doctrine, which declared that the United States would depend on 
its Asian allies to assume more of the responsibility for containing 
communism in the region. But the Japanese by this time were 
overwhelmingly opposed to direct involvement in regional security 
organizations.43 While South Korea dispatched more than 300,000 troops 
to fight alongside the Americans, the Japanese avoided direct military 
involvement. At the same time, the Japanese procurement industry entered 
a new period of rapid expansion. Profits were staggering. In the late 1960s 
Washington's annual military expenditure in Japan was almost invariably 
larger than its expenditure in Vietnam itself.44 
Through administrations under the two prime ministers, Ikeda and 
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Sato, the Yoshida Doctrine had been institutionalized and had become a 
national consensus. Without the Yoshida Doctrine and its apparent 
constitutional sanctions, the pressure on Japan to contribute in a direct 
military way to the Cold War effort would have been almost irresistible. 
Thus, the Yoshida Doctrine had been set as national strategy of Japan by 
Prime Minister Yoshida and had been institutionalized by his faithful 
successors through 1960s. 
3. Expanding Independent Security (1973-1990) 
Japan's foreign policy up to the early 1970s had been based on the 
assumption that U.S. protection and support could be taken for granted. 
Through the 1950s and 1960s, the absolute superiority of U.S. military 
power in the western Pacific, the Japanese Constitution, a poor economy, 
Japanese anti-war sentiment, and neighbors' fears about Japanese rearming, 
had made Japan free from the requirement of increasing its military 
capability and from devising a new national strategy. Japan could pursue an 
economics-first policy based on a narrowly defined sense of its own self- 
interest under those circumstances. The changes in the international 
environment and in U.S. foreign and security policies during the 1970s, 
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however, threatened all those comfortable restrictions and demanded new 
responses from Japan. Its leaders realized they could no longer take the 
benign nature of the international environment for granted but would have 
to work to maintain it in the face of rapid political and economic changes. 
The Nixon Doctrine in 1969, which expressed the responsibility of 
an indigenous nation to defend itself from the communist expansionism, the 
United States' approach to mainland China, and the United States' 
withdrawal from Vietnam encouraged Japanese leaders to doubt the 
credibility of the United States' security guarantee. 
The two oil crises were great shocks to not only Japan's economy, 
but also to the Japanese people. The Japanese realized the need to diversify 
their suppliers of resources, which because of their dependence on foreign 
energy supplies was inescapable.45 Japan's efforts to reduce its dependency 
on foreign energy by developing energy-saving technologies and improving 
infrastructure which increases efficiency, could not solve its energy problem 
fundamentally. As a nation which depends highly on foreign resources and 
trade, Japan had to concentrate its efforts to secure natural resources. 
Japan's economy was also too big to be confined within the U.S. bloc. Since 
Japan's   economic   structure   relies   on   foreign   trade   and   depends   on 
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international   stability,   any   regional   conflict  would   be   harmful   to  the 
Japanese economy. 
The Japanese government felt freer to pursue a more active 
multilateral diplomacy after the United States had handed back Okinawa to 
the mainland in 1972. With the reversion of Okinawa, all pending issues 
from the aftermath of the war were resolved-except the intractable Northern 
Territories problem with the Soviet Union-and this reinforced the 
impression that Japan was standing at the beginning of a new age in its 
relationship with the rest of the world. 
As a result, while, they tried to consolidate the relationship with the 
United States, Japan's leaders started to devise its own more active foreign 
and security policy. For the first time Japan departed radically from its 
position of aligning with US positions on major issues by adopting a pro- 
Arab stance in the 1973 oil crisis and by joining the West European 
countries in taking a more accommodating line on Arab demands. With the 
turning point of those events, Japan's leaders tried to diversify the country's 
foreign policy and tried to improve relations with as many countries as 
possible. It was called 'omni-directional diplomacy'(zenhoi gaiko). Japan 
eagerly tried to be involved in international organizations and forums to deal 
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with the economic problems of the Low Developed Countries(LDCs).46 
And Japan stepped up its aid program to the strategically important states, 
such as Pakistan, Egypt, and Turkey. In Asia, beyond its war reparations 
to neighboring countries, Japan had used its economic aid to secure natural 
resources and regional stability. Between 1978 and 1980, Japan more than 
doubled its annual Official Development Assistance(ODA) allocations, 
fulfilling a pledge made by Prime Minister Fukuda during his trip to 
Southeast Asian countries in 1977. Natural resources abundant countries, 
such as Indonesia and China, have been in the top rank of countries in 
receiving Japan's ODA. 
Japan also started to develop more active military security 
measures. In October 1976 the National Defense Council under Prime 
Minister Miki, approved the National Defense Program Outline(NDPO) 
setting the basic policy for the defense buildup after the fourth plan. The 
NDPO prescribes the objective for possessing the assorted functions required 
for national defense, while emphasizing retaining a well-balanced posture in 
terms of organization and deployment. This includes a logistical support 
system, thereby maintaining a sufficient surveillance and warning posture 
in peacetime and the capability to cope efficiently with situations up to 
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limited and small scale aggression. Japan's defense capability since FY 1977 
has been improved in accordance with the NDPO.47 The NDPO gave great 
flexibility to Japan's defense planning by signaling two important policy 
changes. Firstly, the previous approach of planning to meet a specific threat 
was discarded in preference for a defense structure smoothly adapted to 
confront emergency situations. Secondly, the previous pattern of fixed build- 
up programs spanning a given period of time was to be scrapped and 
replaced with a more flexible system where decisions would be taken each 
fiscal year. This annual approach was short-lived, however. 
Japan's military role expanded much in the November 1978 
Guidelines for Japan-United States Defense Cooperation by assuming that 
the SDF will be responsible for strategic defense, while the U.S. military 
would take responsibility for strategic offense in response to large scale 
aggression. However, Japan's government had to claim that it had no right 
to collective defense and that any US help was different from the security 
arrangement of NATO to meet public opposition. In 1981 the Japanese 
Foreign Minister actually had to resign after the Security Treaty was called 
an "alliance' by Prime Minister Suzuki.48 
Moreover, when Prime Minister Suzuki reluctantly agreed to the 
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sharing of operational duties in the protection of sea-lanes around Japan, and 
when Prime Minister Nakasone expanded its sea-lane defense role to include 
some functions in blockading the straits around Japan49, the concept of 
Japan's security and military capability expanded greatly. Japan's MSDF has 
participated in RIMPAC-mid-Pacific naval war games conducted in 
conjunction with the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand 
from 1980, and including South Korea after 1988. In 1981, for the first 
time, GSDF units held joint maneuvers with the U.S. Army in Japan and in 
Hawaii, and in May 1983 participated for the first time in a joint command- 
post exercise in the continental U.S. at Fort Ord, California. Moreover, 
Japan held the first domestic joint exercise involving GSDF, MSDF, and 
ASDF in July 1981.50 
While, Japan consistently expanded its sphere of influence and 
military capability, it tried to keep its national strategy as long as possible. 
When the Miki Cabinet adopted the NDPO in 1976, it stated that defense 
spending should be kept within "one percent of GNP" as a guide line for 
this long-range program. Although some members of the government 
considered such a guide line unrealistic at that time, this rule was set as a 
kind of target for the time being in view of the need to indicate and explain 
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to the people the size of defense spending. Previous defense build-up 
programs had clearly set their time limit of five years, and noted the 
quantity of weapons to be procured and estimated the amount of funds 
needed. The economic confusion of 1976 resulting from the first Oil Crisis, 
made it difficult for the government to forecast the economic situation in the 
following five years and to estimate defense expenditures needed for that 
period. Based on this condition, the Miki Government gave the NDPO great 
flexibility, which thus, could be estimated by the year. In other aspects, it 
seemed that swelling defense spending made the people anxious about Japan 
turning into a major military power. Thus, the government needed to 
respond to this concern. While to the Defense Agency this one percent of 
GNP guaranteed a stable defense budget, to the people, it provided a safe 
guard. Although this rule was broken by Prime Minister Nakasone in 1987, 
it generally has been kept as an acceptable limit of defense spending among 
Japan's government and the  Japanese public. 
A number of ideas and concepts that had started to appear in Japan 
after the 1973-4 oil crisis were merged in the a report which marked a 
turning point in Japan's postwar foreign and security policy. Among them, 
Japan's most serious response to the changing international environment 
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emerged in 1980 with the Report on Comprehensive National Security. The 
report was compiled by a study group instituted by Prime Minister Ohira 
Masayoshi, who had also set up other study groups to investigate Japan's 
economic relationships and the Pacific Basin Community idea. The report 
characterized the termination of clear American supremacy in both military 
and economic spheres in the 1970s as a most fundamental change and stated 
that U.S. military power was no longer able to provide its allies and friends 
with a complete security guarantee. According to the report, Japan intended 
to preach for a peaceful world while depending on others to do something 
to achieve it. The group suggested that the new situation required efforts on 
three levels: "efforts to turn the overall international environment into a 
favorable one; self-reliant efforts to cope with threats; and as intermediary 
efforts, efforts to create a favorable international environment within a 
limited scope while protecting security in solidarity with countries sharing 
the same ideals and interests."51 Although the term 'comprehensive 
security' is no longer in vogue, all Japanese governments since 1980 have 
based their responses on the analysis of the report and followed its 
recommendations with more or less vigor and success. 
Two points  in  particular  in the  report have  had  a  long-term 
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influence:     its    dismissal    of    omnidirectional    diplomacy,     and     its 
recommendation that the country's national security policy be integrated into 
an overall framework. The Ohira cabinet abandoned the short-lived post-oil 
shock policy of omnidirectional diplomacy, which had never been credible 
and  had only been criticized by Japan's Western allies as a mask for 
opportunism and the evasion of responsibility. As a signatory of the US- 
Japan Security Treaty, which the government always declared to be the basis 
of its security policy, Japan could not possibly conduct omnidirectional 
diplomacy   and   at   the   same   time   maintain   equidistance   from   both 
superpowers. The 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, with China was 
clearly directed against the Soviet Union, and therefore Tokyo could no 
longer claim any shadow   of doubt as to its position in the global rivalry 
between the superpowers. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the U.S. 
hostage crisis in Iran demanded a clear statement that Japan belong to the 
West if it were not to risk diplomatic isolation. 
The other major point, the declaration that national defense should 
be an integral part of Japan's security in the broadest sense, led to the 
formulation of the term "comprehensive security.' This was defined as a 
policy to protect Japan against all sorts of external threats (the report itself 
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also included countermeasures against earthquakes), through a combination 
of diplomacy, national defense, economic and other measures. The term thus 
freed Japan's national security from the straitjacket of the Security Treaty 
with the United States, allowing Japan to secure its external environment by 
other means, such as aid to strategically important countries, and 
transcending to some extent the sharp divide between the system of the 
Peace Constitution and the system of the Security Treaty.52 
Some Japanese criticized the concept of comprehensive security as 
being a smokescreen for increased military efforts, while others argued that 
it would divert attention from the necessity of increased military 
contribution. In any case, the concept of comprehensive security has been 
very useful excuse to avoid greater defense efforts under U.S. pressure on 
Japan. And it has been an excellent cause to persuade the Japanese for the 
need of military capabilities, too, because it made it easier to elevate 
military efforts to a more or less equal rank beside diplomacy and economic 
measures. On balance, the concept of the comprehensive security doctrine 
has contributed to expanding Japan's role in international politics through 
economic, political and military means. 
Based on comprehensive security, Japan moved toward becoming 
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more actively involved in international politics in the 1980s. Starting with 
Prime Minister Fukuda's visit to the ASEAN countries in 1977, Japan began 
to take diplomatic initiatives to ensure international stability in Asia. 
Political and economic steps were taken to support the ASEAN countries, 
particularly Thailand, in the face of the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea. 
Gradually expanding her diplomatic horizon beyond Asia, Japan began to 
gear economic assistance toward wider strategic considerations (Thailand, 
Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt were among the first beneficiaries of this new 
policy) and to participate in the concerted political actions of the Western 
industrialized democracies, such as the boycott of the Olympic Games in 
Moscow and trade sanctions against the Soviet Union over the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan.53 
Through the 1980s, under the strong pressure of the Reagan 
administration combined with the strong desires of Prime Minister 
Nakasone, Japan eagerly tried to improve its military capability based on 
the NDPO. Prime Minister Nakasone's efforts to increase its military 
capability resulted in accomplishment of the NDPO by 1990 and changing 
the National Defense Council into the National Security Council. 
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B. THE EVOLUTION OF THE JAPANESE DEFENSE 
ESTABLISHMENT 
Based on the principle of least armament, Japanese leaders have 
denounced massive armament and involvement in regional or global 
conflicts, yet, they have developed their own military forces slowly but 
surely. 
Japanese defense capabilities since the First Defense Build-up 
Plan( 1958-1960) have increased within the framework of the United States- 
Japan Security Treaty system. The first plan focused on building-up the 
Ground SDF in order fill the gap created by the rapid withdrawal of US 
ground forces after the Korean War. The second plan( 1962-1966) set out to 
strengthen the Maritime and Air SDF to allow for a conventional response 
to aggression in a regional war. The third( 1967-1971) and fourth( 1972-1976) 
followed the same policy, introducing new weapons and modernizing the 
SDF. 
In October 1976 the National Defense Council approved the 'National 
Defense Program Outline' setting the basic policy for the defense build-up 
after the fourth plan. The outline stipulated that the defense structure should 
possess various functions required for national defense, while retaining a 
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balanced organization and deployment, including logistical support. It aimed 
at building a basic defense capability which would make an effective 
response to 'small scale, limited aggression' possible. The 1986-1990 Mid- 
Term Defense Program and the new 1991-1995 Program are both based on 
the outline. 
NDPO prescribes that Japan's defense capabilities are based on: 
1. relying on US nuclear deterrence for countering nuclear 
threats; 
2. cooperating with the United States in responding to large 
scale conventional threats and in naval operation; 
3. deterring through its own resources any limited, small-scale 
agression.54 
It is assumed that the SDF will be responsible for strategic defense, 
while the U.S. military takes responsibility for strategic offense in response 
to large scale aggression. This division of roles was spelled out in the 
November 1978 Guidelines for Japan-United States Defense Cooperation. 
In the 1980s Japan sought to steadily increase its defense spending and 
to modernize defense capabilities. Over the last decade the Japan Defense 
Agency(JDA) has enjoyed one of the fastest defense expenditure growth 
rates in the world, averaging 6.5 percent between 1980-1989. Defense 
expenditures for fiscal year 1993 are approximate at US $45 billion, rising 
by around 3 percent over the 1991-5 Mid-Term Defense Build-up Plan. 
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Military spending at this rate will be just below the one percent ceiling. 
Although the growth of defense expenditures is under review, the fact 
remains that Japan is alone among the G-7 industrialized nations in 
increasing its military spending. After the demise of the former Soviet 
Union, Japan's defense expenditures became the second highest in the 
world, and as the Japan's economy is expanding consistently, the size of 
Japan's defense expenditures will grow steadily.55 
Japan's military dominance is particularly telling in the Asia-Pacific 
region. Japan's relative defense expenditures is substantial: five times that 
of Australia, three time that of North and South Korea combined, and 
almost 20 percent greater than China's.56 
The high absolute value of Japanese defense expenditures is reflected 
in the country's build-up of the Self Defense Forces' military capability. The 
GSDF now consists of 13 infantry divisions and two composite brigades, 
with an authorized personnel of 180,000(actual personnel 151,176).57 It has 
1,200 tanks soon to include 200 of Japanese developed Type-90 model and 
930 armored vehicles. The strength of the MSDF is impressive. In size it 
is little smaller than that of China's navy, but when we consider quality, it 
is the most modernized navy in Asia. The 44,000 naval personnel operate 
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a fleet of 16 submarines and over 60 surface ships including 42 destroyers 
and 16 frigates. Not only does this represent one of the most modern navies 
in the world in terms of hull life, but in numbers it is nearly three time the 
size of the US Seventh Fleet whose strategic responsibility covers the 
Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. The MSDF's 100 P-3C anti-submarine 
warfare aircraft are four times the number of P-3Cs deployed by the US 
Seventh Fleet. More significant is the construction by Ishikawajima Harima 
of a 5,500 ton dock landing ship which has the potential for operating 
VSTOL aircraft. This could be viewed as an interim step towards the MSDF 
acquiring an aircraft carrier. In the mid-1980s, they expanded their sea 
defense zone from 200 to 1,000 nautical miles. 
The ASDF possesses 46,000 personnel. The 130 F-4EJ Interceptors 
are in the process of modernization. These and other long range fighters 
including the advanced F-15EJ Eagle total about 340 planes. The ASDF also 
has some of the West's most advanced air defense systems including the 
Patriot SAM that proved so effective in the Gulf War. In addition there are 
eight Grumman E-2C Hawkeye early warning aircraft with a further five 
on order as of 1994. Furthermore, the new Mid-Term Defense 
Program(FYl991-1995) places higher emphasis on strengthening Japan's 
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capabilities of greater regional strategic importance to include more 
advanced command, control, communications and intelligence systems, an 
over the horizon radar system with 3,000 km defection distance, air 
refueling planes for E-3A's, and light aircraft carriers. 
Although 273,801 authorized personnel for the SDF is a small 
number, compared to those of China, North and South Korea, the Japanese 
SDF's capabilities represent the most modern armed forces in East Asia. 
C. FROM RENUNCIATION OF WAR POTENTIAL TO 
SENDING TROOPS OVERSEAS: 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE 
How is it possible for Japan to considerably expand its defense 
capability without amending its constitution which renounces war potential? 
The peace constitution comprises two main parts: the first pertaining to war 
renunciation and the second to the prohibition of 'offensive' war potential. 
The Constitution has never been amended. Hence the existence of 
about 250,000 Japanese military personnel surely hints at something 
unconstitutional. In the Japanese manner, it is all matter of interpretation. 
Japan's official interpretation of Article 9 is that it retains the right of 
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national self defense under international law. But Article 9 states that Japan 
could neither wage war nor maintain an armed force, even for the purpose 
of self-defense.58 For pragmatic purposes, attempts to overcome this 
constitutional paradox have led Japanese government officials to perform 
diplomatic gymnastics in the post war period. Efforts to justify the existence 
of Japan's armed forces have attempted to deflect attention from the 
Constitution, focusing instead on Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 
which states that self-defense is a right of every signatory nation. 
Between 1945 and the outbreak of the Korean War Japan possessed 
no armed forces. Thereafter, to replace Japan-based U.S. forces deployed 
in Korea the Americans encouraged the establishment of a 75,000 Japanese 
Police Reserve Force. This Police Reserve had evolved by April 1952 into 
the Japanese National Safety Force(NSF). Prime Minister Yoshida with 
Foreign Minister Ashida (who also acted as the safety minister) had to be 
intellectually nimble in response to awkward questions about his portfolio. 
Against opposition party attack, they maintained that war potential forbidden 
by Article 9 could be differentiated from "defense potential"; also that the 
NSF were not unconstitutional because they had no capability to wage 
modern warfare, and thus were not an offensive threat.59 This definitional 
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dispute over defensive vs offensive capability represented the opening shots 
of a debate that has continued to rage. 
As a starting point of this dispute, over time there has been a gradual, 
more militaristic interpretation of the Peace Constitution, which its 
ambiguity allows. In 1957 Japan's first Five Year Defense Build-up Plan 
was endorsed providing for the expansion and modernization of the 
Country's SDF. Later in 1976 greater flexibility was introduced through the 
publication of NDPO. This policy meant that the previous pattern of fixed 
build-up programs spanning a given period of time was to be scrapped and 
replaced with a more flexible system where decisions would be taken each 
fiscal year. In order to get approval of the opposition parties and persuade 
the general public, Prime Minister Miki adopted the policy of a one percent 
ceiling of GNP. 
In 1987 Prime Minister Nakasone while allying fears over the 
reincarnation of Japanese militarism conceded that for the Mid-Term 
Defense Program( 1986-1990), the one percent threshold would be broken. 
Justifying this policy-break, he argued that while [the plan's raised 
expenditure] comes to 1.04 percent of GNP on a yearly basis, it is almost 
the same as one percent.60 
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Japan participated in mine-sweeping operations with its MSDF's 
minesweepers after the Gulf War without amending its Constitution. Japan 
decided to participate in UN Peacekeeping Operations by passing the 
Japanese UN Peacekeeping Cooperation Law(PKO bill) in the Diet in June 
1992. As a result of this decision, its GSDF has been participating in UN 
Peacekeeping Operations in Combodia and Africa. This means that the PKO 
bill ended the ban on sending SDF troops abroad, which had been a key 
principle of Japan's defense policy. Although it has limitations, such as 
limiting deployments to missions requiring logistical and humanitarian 
support, the monitoring of elections, and providing aid in civil 
administration, this step means that Japan started to become more involved 
militarily in world politics. Its activities go beyond economic contributions, 
and now the future direction of Japan's defense policy is not up to its legal 
basis, but up to the interpretation of Japanese politicians, and public 
opinions. 
Amidst the debates over sending the SDF abroad, Ichiro Ozawa, as 
secretary-general of the LDP and de facto author of the UN Peace 
Cooperation bill, insisted that SDF members participate without giving up 
their status as members of the military. Although the bill failed, he believed 
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that introducing it and forcing debate on the constitutionality of sending SDF 
personnel to cooperate with international peacekeeping efforts was in itself 
a political achievement.61 
The defense policy of Japan has shifted first from an "absolute" 
renunciation of war capability to a strictly defensive defense, then to a more 
flexible defense, and last to dispatching the SDF abroad. Thus, it seems 
clear that Article 9 often has been used cynically and interpreted by the 
conservative, mainstream leadership to suit their political needs and their 
fundamental definition of Japanese national purposes. Interpretations have 
been political rather than legal judgements. That is possible because Japan's 
Supreme Court, whose judges are appointed by the Cabinet, has sidestepped 
every opportunity to interpret Article 9, declaring it a "political question." 
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III. THE KOREA ISSUE IN JAPAN'S 
COLD-WAR SECURITY POLICY 
During the late 19th and the early 20th century, Korea's naive efforts 
to keep its sovereignty by attempting to play the various regional powers off 
against each other, without any indigenous ability to guarantee its security 
resulted in the loss of its national sovereignty to Japan in 1910 after Japan 
won consecutive wars against China(1985) and Czarist Russia(l 904-1905). 
Japan's perception of Korea's role in its security is that Japan's security is 
threatened when the forces on the Asian continent are not constrained by a 
principle power restricting foreign expeditions and military conquest; and 
when the resistance of the Koreans collapses.62 Korea was liberated from 
Japanese colonial rule as a result of Japan's defeat in World War II by the 
Allied powers in 1945. These historical events not only set Korea's post- 
World War II foreign relations, but also severely influenced Koreans' 
feeling about foreigners. Koreans' strong distrust and animosity toward 
Japanese have been only the most intense manifestation of its total distrust 
of foreigners in general. This attitude, paradoxically, ended Korea's naivete 
in its foreign relations and strengthened the national identity of Koreans 
which developed into an important catalyst for South and North Korea's 
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nation building efforts. This feeling is best expressed by an old children's 
jump-rope chant: 
Don't be cheated by Russians, 
Don't rely on Americans, 
The Japanese are rising again, 
So, Koreans, be careful.63 
During the post-World War II period, the relationship between South 
Korea and Japan was severely constrained by the historical legacies of 
Japanese imperialism. The colonial experience did indeed breed animosities 
and  hatred  which  continue  to influence  the perceptions and  cognitive 
structures of Koreans today. This stereotype of misunderstanding has risen 
and fallen depending on the issues, such as history text books, apologies for 
wrongdoing of colonial rule, compensation for victims of the atomic bombs 
and comfort women, the Korean minority in Japan, and Kim Dae Jung 
kidnapping. This suggests that the major sources of tension between Korea 
and   Japan   are   not   simply   attitudinal   but   historically   structured   and 
developed. It also points out that top priority should be given to a genuine 
"settlement"   of the  historical  past  for  the  sake  of the  future  of the 
relationship between the two countries. 
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A. THE KOREAN WAR 
The United States' deep involvement in East Asia in every aspect 
during the postwar period almost make it impossible for us to think about 
the security relationship between South Korea and Japan without considering 
U.S. policy toward them. U.S. policy in Asia right after the Second World 
War, focused on China as a stabilizing factor to check the reemergence of 
Japanese militarism. In line with this policy, U.S. interests in Korea right 
after World War II were to create a single, unified, democratic, independent 
state supporting the stability of Northeast Asia. As the confrontation with the 
USSR became obvious, however, U.S. policy shifted from China- centered 
to Japan-centered. The ascent of Mao Zedong and the founding of the 
People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949 gave a decisive impetus to 
form the 'containment policy' in Asia. As a result Japan's position changed 
from the former enemy to a newly important ally to the United States. The 
United States, as the occupying power in Japan, accepted and adopted as its 
own the Japanese conviction that the security and welfare of Japan itself 
depended on the security of Korea. Korea in the hands of a hostile nation 
or group of nations would menace the very survival of Japan/ 64 
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US goals in Korea supported the Republic of Korea as a sole 
legitimate government partially for the sake of Japan, not only for the sake 
of South Korea itself. Between World War II and the Korean War, the U.S. 
military advised President Truman that "from the stand point of military 
security, the US has little strategic interest in maintaining the present troops 
and bases in Korea."65 Thus, U.S. interests in South Korea were 
subjugated to the national interests of Japan. Nevertheless, the United States 
had to give considerable support including military organization, and large 
amount of equipment to strengthen the ROK's capability to resist a possible 
attack from the North and to develop it as a democratic stable state. Because 
America was leading the newly established United Nations, the security of 
the ROK was essential for the maintenance of the United States privileged 
position. However, U.S. support for South Korea was limited to a certain 
degree. The U.S. did not want to make South Korea too strong, thereby 
enabling it to invade North Korea under some hot-headed leaders. When the 
U.S. occupation forces in South Korea did withdraw from Korea they left 
only a few military advisers in late 1949. This U.S. policy was reflected in 
the address of Secretary of State, Dean Acheson in January 12, 1950, which 
stated that the defense perimeter of the United States in Asia included Japan 
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and the Philippines, but excluded Taiwan and South Korea. Therefore, from 
the U.S. point of view, South Korea's security up to the outbreak of the 
Korean War depended on the security of Japan. 
The  outbreak   of war  in  Korea  brought  about  an   unanticipated 
intensification    of   U.S.-ROK    military    relations,    once    the   Truman 
Administration   decided   to   override  the   previously   stated  position   of 
Acheson. That war, and the extension of U.S. protection over Korea, was 
partially a response to global anti-communist incentives.  It also was a 
response, however, to American recognition that North Korea's aggression 
against South Korea represented an Asian corollary of the global communist 
Cold War threat. On October 1, 1953, South Korea and the United States 
signed the Mutual Defense Treaty, which Secretary of State Dulles said 
would prevent a renewal of communist aggressions in Korea.   Earlier 
American treaties in the Pacific area (the ANZUS Treaty and the treaty with 
the Republic of Philippines) were designed primarily with the menace of a 
resurgent  Japan   in   mind.   Together  with   similar  agreements  with   the 
Republic  of China on Taiwan,  Japan and the  Southeast Asian Treaty 
Organization(SEATO), the Korean treaty was intended to create a defense 
system to contain communism.66 
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Because of the U.S. occupation authorities' responsibilities for Japan 
as of mid-1950, the United States was compelled to treat any threat arising 
in Korea from a vantage point with deep roots in Japan's geopolitics.67 
That sequence of events in Korea, with an eye on Korea's role in the still 
emerging Cold War, produced American decisions to reorient the purposes 
of the U.S. occupation of Japan. Instead of a punitive controlling of Japan, 
the  United  States  embarked  on  a  campaign  to  encourage  a Japanese 
renaissance that might make it the Asian centerpiece of its regional Cold 
War efforts. As a result of this rethinking of Japan's strategic importance, 
U.S.  occupation policy changed rapidly.  The pace of ending the U.S. 
occupation of Japan was accelerated. Japan was encouraged to regain its 
economic prosperity for reasons which had shifted from post-war recovery 
to an early Cold War strategic rationale with a generic global focus, and 
which now developed a new and explicitly regional focus. Japan had to be 
domestically resilient enough to resist the strains of a war being fought in 
its back yard, and sufficiently autonomous to permit the United States to 
divert its attention from a quiescent issue (controlling Japan) to a more 
pressmg issue. One of the prominent parts of this process of adaptation to 
a   rapidly   changing   Cold   War   environment   entailed   U.S.   occupation 
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68 leadership in the creation of a post war-Japan's version of armed-forces. 
As a result of the Korean War, South Korea gained only a loose 
Defense Treaty from the United States, and it had to pay attention constantly 
to U.S. policies in order to seek firm U.S. commitments to the treaty. On 
the other hand, Japan recovered its sovereignty in 1951, earlier than it 
expected, got an explicit security guarantee from the United States, and had 
the "heaven-given' opportunity for its economic recovery. 
The Korean War influenced the relationships between South Korea 
and Japan in different ways. It was the Korean War which led South 
Koreans to realize the importance of Japan as a part of an alliance of 
necessity in coordinating its strategic posture against communist 
aggression.69 But it was also the Korean War that aggravated the undertone 
of Koreans' suspicion of Japan. First of all, many Koreans began to suspect 
that Japan tried to find the solution to her security problem through the 
division of the Korean peninsula. Secondly, Koreans believed that the key 
to Japan's post-war economic success was largely related to the Korean 
War. Consequently, Koreans' stereotypes of Japan, which see Japan's 
success as coming at Korea's expense, have faded since the Korean War.70 
Conversely, while the Japanese started to realize the importance of South 
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Korea for her security from the communist threat, they still tend to regard 
Koreans as they did during the   colonial era. 
The Korean War strengthened South Korea's own version of security 
relations with the United States, however, the security of South Korea is still 
highly dependent on U.S. interests in the security of Japan. During the 
debate about the U.S. commitments to the Defense Treaty with South Korea, 
when asked if the ROK was necessary for the defense of the United States 
in the Pacific, General Ridgway replied: "Positively. Yes, Sir." He 
maintained that the ROK could contribute to the security of the United States 
in the event of general war or renewal of hostilities in Northeast Asia. If 
communist forces were to overrun the Korean Peninsula, they would directly 
and seriously threaten an area of vital strategic importance to the United 
States; namely, the offshore island chain in the Far East and, above all, the 
key element in the chain—the main Japanese islands.71 
From the Japanese point of view, as long the United States handles 
well the stability of the Korean Peninsula, there is no reason for Japan to 
worry about threat from the Korean Peninsula. The only thing Japan had to 
do was to pursue its economic benefit from Korea, as it did vis-a-vis the 
United States. In sum, the Korean War made it clear that the U.S.-Japan 
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defense relationship and the U.S.-South Korea defense relationship had 
related-yet dramatically different-roots. And it made it clear that the 
security of South Korea was essential to Japan's security which was 
cornerstone of the United States interests in Asia. 
B. JAPAN-ROK DIPLOMATIC NORMALIZATION 
The negotiation of diplomatic normalization between South Korea and 
Japan started in 1951 and concluded in 1965. Urged by Washington which 
was eager to create a trilateral defense structure to facilitate its war efforts 
in Korea and to confront the communist bloc, the two nations embarked on 
a settlement process that was to take fourteen turbulent years before they 
could conclude a treaty. It might be right to say that until the early 1960s, 
Korean diplomacy was profoundly beyond the control of Koreans, who were 
in the United States' hands.72 Though Japan officially became an 
independent state in 1951, the United States had strongly influenced Japan's 
fate too during that period. Considering these conditions, it is not difficult 
for us to understand how strongly historical legacies influenced that 
negotiation process. 
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Then, what made it possible to conclude this treaty? In South Korea, 
Park Chung Hee came to power with the "most" developed groups on May 
16, 1961. He had a strong feeling that the only way of building a genuinely 
independent nation depended on economic development.73 Moreover, he 
had no alternative but to choose Japan's Meiji Revolution and Japan's 
economic assistance as the model of his nation-building scheme, and as the 
mean of achieving his economic goal. He knew well the real power of 
Japan. He was a graduate of the Japanese military academy, an officer in the 
Imperial Japanese army, obviously fluent in Japanese, and seemed to have 
no apparent grudge or contempt towards the Japanese compared to the 
position of President Syngman Rhee. In this regard, his position was 
significantly different from that of Syngman Rhee. Rhee maintained his 
power by appealing to the people's anti-Japanese and anti-communist 
feelings, and by showing his patriotism which was often expressed as an 
effort to unify his country. Rhee ruined the negotiations of diplomatic 
normalization between the two countries with his establishment of what 
became known as the "Rhee line" on January 18 1952. But the Park Chung 
Hee government, faced with the need to attract new sources of investment 
capital for his economic development plans, and with growing American 
66 
pressure to restore relations with Japan out of strategic considerations, 
decided to push ahead with normalization with Japan in the face of fierce 
domestic opposition. 
In Japan, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato signaled the importance he 
attached to improving relations with Japan's immediate neighbor, South 
Korea. He made it clear that normalization with Korea was the beginning of 
Japan's Asian diplomacy. These point of views were strengthened by 
strategic understandings. In the post-war period, South Korea and Japan 
accepted America's assumptions about East Asian security as an inevitable 
concomitant of American power in world affairs. In the early 1960s, the 
United States was starting to be involved in the Cuba crisis and the Vietnam 
War. Under these circumstance, Japan had to be somewhat supportive of 
U.S. requests. Japan still faced the problem of constitutional limitation and 
the people's strong anti-military feelings on building up a war capability. 
Therefore, its logical policy was to build a closer association with its allies 
by showing a perceptive political regard for their political and economic 
interests. The policy adopted by Japan was that of proxy military force by 
which Japan concentrates on economic growth at home while offering 
generous and sophisticated involvement in their economic projects to deter 
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the communist threat. There could be little doubt that President Park also 
wanted to see the two countries coordinate their political and security 
interests through economic cooperation. 
This compromise attracted heavy criticism in both countries.74 The 
terms of normalization began to be condemned by many South Koreans as 
a national sellout. First of all, the Treaty of Normalization was not clear 
about Japan's recognition of the Republic of Korea as the sole legitimate 
government on the Korean peninsula.  Secondly, Japan did not make a 
formal apology over its colonial rule, expressing only "regret" over the 
unfortunate period in the two countries' relations. These two issues, coupled 
with genuine fear of Japan, remain unresolved in the minds of Koreans and 
continue to haunt the relationship between the two countries. Thirdly, the 
Treaty was construed as a second Katsura-Taft agreement through which the 
United States shifted its burden of Korean security protection to Japan. 
These feelings in turn burst into outrage, eventually leading to nationwide 
demonstrations in the ROK against the South Korean-Japanese talks. 
The Japanese opposition came from a different dimension. Whereas, 
the Korean opposition feared that Korean security might be sacrificed by the 
United States for the sake of Japan, the Japanese opposition was concerned 
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that Japan would be drawn by the Treaty into the East-West conflict. To be 
sure, from the beginning of the talks the Sato government believed that it 
was in the geopolitical interest of Japan to support South Korea against the 
communist threat of North Korea. But, at the same time, Japan did not want 
to be involved in the confrontational policy pursued by Korea and the United 
States. 
As the talks concluded, Japan began to provide Korea with a total of 
$800 million, of which $200 million was in the form of public loans, $300 
million in grants, and $300 million in commercial credits over a ten year 
period starting in 1966. This assistance became one of the contributors to 
South Korea's rapid economic development. 
Since normalization, the economic interdependence deepened 
significantly. Japan became the largest supplier of Korean imports and the 
second largest outlet for its exports. Not only has Japan been Korea's most 
important trading partner, but also its most important source of foreign loans 
and investment capital, and technology. 
To South Korea, the Treaty became one turning point of its foreign 
policy and economic development. From the end of World War II until that 
time, South Korea's security and foreign policy were almost fully dependent 
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on the United States. Also, economic development plans were guided by 
U.S. advisers who had focused on agricultural development. From that time 
South Koreans started to make efforts to get to know Japan, escaping from 
an unconditional animosity toward it. The Treaty became a starting point for 
South Korea to decide her foreign policy based on pragmatic positions. 
South Koreans adapted the Japanese model of economic development which 
emphasized export-oriented industries. This shift from strong objection to 
Japan, to learn from Japan, developed into more pragmatic "catch up to 
Japan" policy later. Also, the Treaty became the foundation of South 
Korea's foreign policy which started to shift from passive client state to 
more active equal partner in dealing with its main patron nation, the United 
States. 
C. KOREA AS A FACTOR IN JAPAN'S SECURITY AFTER 
NORMALIZATION 
President Nixon's enunciation of the Guam Doctrine in July 1969, 
resulted in the Korea clause on the security relationship between South 
Korea and Japan, and had significant political and military implications. The 
Nixon Doctrine called for a linkage between Japanese and South Korean 
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security, and, in November of that year, when Prime Minister Sato visited 
Washington for a summit talk with President Nixon, a phrase was inserted 
into the Nixon-Sato Communique stating that the security of the Republic of 
Korea was "essential to Japan's own security."75 
The Korea Clause was a culmination of a prolonged Japanese- 
American negotiations on the reversion of Okinawa to Japan. Although the 
United States recognized the residual rights of Japan in Okinawa, it 
continued to administer the islands after the Second World War: the islands 
were of crucial strategic value to the United States simply because of their 
location in the Western Pacific. In the late 1960s, the United States was 
prepared to accede to intense nationalistic feeling in Japan and give the 
islands back, but in turn it requested that Japan grant the United States the 
unrestricted right to use American bases in Okinawa for the defense of 
Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam.76 The long negotiations ended with the Sato 
visit, when the two sides agreed on the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 
1972 in return for the inclusion of the Korea Clause in the joint 
communique. 
The practical meaning of the Korea clause was delineated by Prime 
Minister Sato in his speech at the National Press Club after the summit 
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meeting:if South Korea or Taiwan came under attack, Japan would regard 
it as a threat to the peace and security of the Far East, including Japan, and 
would take prompt and positive measures so that the United States could use 
its military bases and facilities within Japan (which would include Okinawa 
after 1972.) to meet the armed attack.77 This Japanese commitment was 
necessary for the United States because, without it, U.S. ability to provide 
support for South Korea would be severely limited. As Kubo Takuya, chief 
of the Defense Bureau of the Japanese Self-Defense Agency, put it: 
Only if there is a Mutual Security Treaty between Japan and the 
United States, and if the U.S. could use Japan, could the U.S. 
provide military support to Korea. Under such a situation, there 
will be no war on the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, the security 
of the Korean Peninsula is essential to Japan.78 
Another contributor to the Korea clause was the Vietnam War. 
Although South Korea dispatched more than two divisions to the Vietnam 
War, it failed to renegotiate the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty along 
NATO lines in order to replace a commitment to consult with each other 
about a proper response to another North Korean attack with a commitment 
for an automatic U.S. military response. South Korea earned a "small" 
amount of money(it was estimated at $546 million from 1965 to 1970) from 
the Vietnam War. This was less than Japan and only a little more than 
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Taiwan-neither of which participated in the war. But South Korea gained 
some combat experience, and many companies gained experience and 
reputations especially in the construction business which became one of the 
most famous South Korean industries. While Japan recovered its whole 
sovereignty over Okinawa by just endorsing the Korea clause and reluctantly 
expressing its agreement with the U.S. position that the U.S. bases in 
Okinawa could be used for the defense of South Korea, Taiwan, and 
Vietnam, the ROK worked must harder to reinforce U.S. respects for it. 
President Nixon's unilateral withdrawal of 20,000 U.S. troops from 
South Korea in 1970, his negotiations with China without consulting with 
Japan, and his actions in the economic arena created the impression that the 
United States would no longer treat Japan as an ally and the interests of the 
United States no longer coincided with those of Japan. The Watergate affair 
and the 1973 oil crisis heightened uncertainty in Japan. As a result of those 
events, Japanese leaders groped to find an independent foreign and security 
policy. As former foreign minister Ohira told a television audience in 
January 1972, Japan wanted to get out of this military dependence on the 
United States and attain political independence in world affairs, just as Japan 
has done in the economic field.79 
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Based on these analyses, Japan did speed up its efforts to diversify its 
resource dependence and to initiate talks with many communist countries 
including North Vietnam. Japanese efforts in foreign policy resulted in 
establishing diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China in 
September 1972. 
As for the security issue, Japanese leaders could not overcome the 
barrier of Article 9 of the constitution. But in drawing up the fourth defense 
build up plan, covering the years 1972-1976, a significant step was taken to 
bolster Japan's defense capability, which aimed at the creation of an 
autonomous defense capacity. Japanese security relations with the United 
States were to be reversed: the Mutual Security Treaty was to supplement 
Japan's own autonomous defense capability rather than the other way 
around. Japan was to maintain an air and sea capacity sufficient to deal with 
any crises.80 Whereas the third plan called for an expenditure of $7.2 
billion, the fourth plan required $16.6 billion. Clearly these changes 
reflected the new U.S. strategy, but they also reflected Japanese doubts 
about U.S. intentions, many Japanese believed that Japan should bolster its 
defense capability for its own sake regardless of U.S. intentions. 
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This more independent foreign and security policy reflected a revision 
of the Korea clause. Foreign minister Fukuda Yoshio in Sato Government, 
was eager to rid Japan of the responsibility it had assumed in the Korea 
clause, which he viewed as not only unnecessary but also detrimental to 
Japanese interests. Its cancellation would remove Japan from the 
anticommunist structure. At the Japanese-American ministerial meeting held 
in September 1971 Fukuda advocated a revision of the Korea clause. In 
October, after Beijing was accepted as the official representative of China 
at the United Nations, Fukuda revealed his proposal at the September 
meeting. He told the Diet on May 16,1972, that the Korea clause had in fact 
lost its validity because of the new, stabilized situation on the Korean 
Peninsula. Prime Minister Sato also expressed the same opinion at a press 
conference in Tokyo January 8 1972, after the summit meeting with 
President Nixon at San Clemente, saying that this particular expression is 
not necessarily valid in describing the situation today, adding that "a 
communique is not a treaty."81 The progress of talks between the two 
Koreas in the early 1970s, contributed to the revision of Japanese security 
perceptions of the Korean Peninsula, too. 
The trend away from the "Cold War structure" accelerated after 
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Tanaka Kakuei succeeded Sato as Prime Minister in July 1972. Foreign 
Minister Kimura Toshio revealed his government's intention to redirect its 
Korea policy, saying that the peace and security of the entire Korean 
Peninsula rather than just South Korea was essential to Japan. His policy 
developed into saying that the Republic of Korea was not the only legal 
government in Korea on September 5 1972. Japanese eagerness to expand 
its sphere of influence in the Korean Peninsula by promoting friendly ties 
with North Korea contrasted sharply with the intense animosity between 
South Korea and Japan triggered by the kidnapping of Kim Dae-jung from 
Tokyo in 1973 and the attempted assassination of President Park Chung Hee 
by a Korean resident of Japan in 1974. 
In the spring of 1975, however, the international environment, 
particularly the collapse of Saigon and its security implications for East 
Asia, strongly encouraged South Korea and Japan to make necessary 
compromises to restore the relationship. The fall of Saigon, the increasing 
belligerence of North Korea, and the discovery of two North Korean tunnels 
under the DMZ awakened leaders of both countries to the necessity of 
shifting the relationship from a confrontational one to a more collaborative 
one. Seoul, faced with the increasing security threat and eager to obtain 
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Japanese support for economic development, took initiatives to make the 
compromises necessary to resolve the pending issues. Tokyo, also concerned 
about the same developments and eager to stabilize its relationship with 
Seoul, made concessions on economic sanctions. As a result of these 
compromises, economic and political relations were back on track in 
September of 1975 when Japan agreed to resume its economic cooperation 
beyond the terms provided in the normalization settlement. On this basis, 
economic and political ties between the two countries gained new 
momentum. The human rights issue triggered by the Kim Dae-jung 
kidnapping which made worse the relationship between South Korea and 
Japan, took only secondary priority compared to the security realignment 
against the communist threat. This became more apparent when the Carter 
administration announced the withdrawal of American ground forces from 
South Korea and made the promotion of human rights the cornerstone of his 
foreign policy. As South Korea and the United States clashed over the issues 
of security commitments and human rights, the prospects for improving the 
relationship between South Korea and Japan steadily improved. 
This  good   relationship   was     maintained   until   the  wake   of the 
assassination of President Park Chung Hee and new military power under 
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Chun came to power. The emergence of an "illegitimate" military 
government and its subsequent demand for a five year $10 billion loan as 
compensation for the security burden South Korea shouldered for Japan 
strengthened Japanese contempt and prejudice. The military coup of 
December 12, 1979 which was described as a "mini-February 26, 1936 
incident" of Japan revived among the Japanese public the feelings of 
arrogance and scorn of the sort that Fukuzawa had harbored in 1895. 
Conversely, the Japanese Education Minister's attempt to reinterpret 
Japanese imperialism evoked anger and protest from Korea and other Asian 
countries. 
It was in this context that the leaders of the two countries sought to 
prevent the relationship from collapsing. In Japan, Prime Minister Nakasone 
Yasuhiro called for a fundamental reorientation of Japanese foreign policy 
away from a passive economic position toward a more active political 
venture under the slogan of sengo no kessan (settlement with the post war 
period). Japan is the major Pacific ally of the United States. But under 
Prime Minister Nakasone's predecessor, Zenko Suzuki, Japanese-American 
relations turned sour because of trade frictions and American irritation over 
Japan's grudging defense effort. Prime Minister Nakasone tried to restore 
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this relations through convincing Americans that Japan was a loyal friend 
and a trustworthy ally, and that when times were difficult, Japan was 
prepared to take up a fair share of the common responsibility for world 
economic stability and the defense of the Western nations. He even said that 
Japan was an "unsinkable carrier" in the Western Pacific.82 Close and 
harmonious relations between Japan and South Korea are very much in 
Washington's interest. Therefore, Prime Minister Nakasone could add 
weight to his presentation by making better political and economic relations 
with South Korea in dealing with his strong partner, the President of the 
United States, Ronald Reagan. Prime Minister Nakasone visited South Korea 
for his first foreign visit just a week before going to Washington in January 
1983. As a political venture, he was willing to associate with South Korea 
as an equal partner. It was the first time a Japanese prime minister had 
visited Seoul officially. And it was the first time a Japanese prime minister 
had defied the bureaucracy-the Foreign Ministry strongly urged Nakasone 
to cleave to tradition and visit Washington first- to launch a major foreign 
policy initiative.83 Nakasone's visit to Seoul paved the way for agreement 
on a US$4 billion Japanese aid package, providing a dramatic solution to the 
acrimonious stalemate behind which lay the question -- never officially 
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acknowledged by Tokyo- of whether Japan is indebted to South Korea for 
shouldering a heavy defense burden which contributes to Japan's security as 
well. 
In South Korea, President Chun felt the need to maintain close 
relations with Tokyo, especially after the Soviet shootdown of KAL-007 in 
September 1983 and the Rangoon incident of the following month. By 
emphasizing the importance of burying the past in relations between the two 
countries, Chun returned Nakasone's visit in September 1984. Prime 
Minister Nakasone visited Seoul again during the 1986 Asian games which 
were held in Seoul. Washington welcomed this rapprochement between 
South Korea and Japan since cooperation between the two was critical for 
its own plans for containing the expansion of the Soviet power in the 
Pacific.84 And though any open security cooperation between Seoul and 
Tokyo was ruled out for some time to come, an improvement in political 
relations could only help to strengthen the third leg in the triangle formed 
by the separate security relations the United States maintains with both 
countries. These good relations among the United States, South Korea, and 
Japan lasted as long as the three "conservative" leaders of these countries 
were in power, which developed into a so-called the association of the three 
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leaders -- President of the United States, Reagan, President of South Korea, 
Chun, and Prime Minister of Japan, Nakasone. 
On this occasion, South Korea and Japan tried to view each other with 
far more enthusiasm than they had at the height of their collaboration in the 
past. For the first time since normalization, the issue of an apology was 
taken seriously. When he received President Chun, Emperor Hirohito tried 
to strike a careful balance between Korean and Japanese sensitivities by 
saying that, "It is indeed regrettable that there was an unfortunate past 
between us for a period in this century, and I believe that it should not be 
repeated."85 This was taken very seriously by a progressive Japanese 
daily as the Emperor's apology, whereas it was criticized by South Korean 
newspapers as a deliberately terse and vague apology compared with the 
address of the West German President Weiszacker that was delivered on the 
occasion of the 40th anniversary of the end of the World War II, in which 
he openly admitted once again the guilt of Nazi Germany.86 In addition, the 
anti-Americanism which was strengthened by the Kwangju democratization 
movement developed into total distrust of foreign countries and influenced 
the relationships between South Korea and Japan automatically. 
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The domestic political developments after the ROK presidential 
election of December 1987 and the general elections of April 1988, and the 
successful hosting of the Olympic Games improved Japanese attitudes 
toward South Korea more than they had been in the 1970s and early 1980s. 
Under the leadership of President Roh Tae-woo, South Korea embarked 
upon a process of political democratization and economic liberalization. This 
movement produced a more promising environment for political, economic, 
and cultural exchanges, and narrowed potential differences over the 
historical legacies between the two countries. Japan was not only supportive 
of this change, but also was serious about striking a political settlement with 
the democratically elected South Korean government on the historical past, 
a fact which was enormously frustrating to most Japanese. In fact, extensive 
consultations were made between the two governments on the issue of the 
new Emperor's apology over the historical past when President Roh paid a 
visit to Japan in May 1990. At the state banquet, Emperor Akihito made a 
formal apology for the past saying that, "I think of the sufferings your 
people underwent during this unfortunate period, which was brought about 
by my country, and cannot help but feel the deepest regret."87 This was 
soon  followed  by  the Japanese government decision to phase out the 
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compulsory fingerprinting of Korean residents in Japan. 
Although unsatisfactory reactions were inevitable in South Korea, the 
issues seemed settled more and more. The change of Japanese attitude 
toward Koreans after the Seoul Olympic Games also contributed to this 
maturing relationship between the two countries. Since normalization, the 
relationship began to shift from confrontation over the ghosts of the 
historical past to a relationship of mutual adjustment of national interests. 
The Seoul Olympic Games, which saw the greatest number of 
participating countries since the Montreal Olympics in 1976, was a real 
turning point in South Korea in almost every aspect. It confirmed that South 
Korea won the competition with North Korea. Not only did it enhance South 
Korea's international position significantly, but it also gave her the best 
opportunity to improve relations with communist countries, especially with 
the Soviet Union under the new Pukbang ChungChek (Northern Politics). 
Since Gorbachev's Krasnoyarsk speech in September 1988, which included 
a statement about the Soviet's desire to develop economic relations with 
South Korea, trade between South Korea and the Soviet Union had increased 
considerably. But South Korea questioned the workability of economic 
cooperation without a political relationship.88 South Korea made clear that 
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the most serious obstacle toward more active economic cooperation was the 
absence of diplomatic normalization. Finally, Gorbachev agreed to accept 
South Korean demands and had a summit meeting with President Roh in San 
Francisco on June 5, 1990, which was followed by a joint communique in 
September which announced the establishment of diplomatic relations 
between the two countries. In December, President Roh paid a state visit to 
the Soviet Union for the first time as a president of South Korea. Also 
President Gorbachev visited Cheju-do in April 1991. 
The reasons for this rapid raapprochment involve mostly the Soviet 
Union's need to learn about South Korea's development experience, to 
receive its aid, its desire to use a South Korea card in dealing with Japan, 
and South Korea's political purpose to open North Korea and its economic 
desire to find new markets. Though South Korea was in a self-imposed 
vacuum regarding communism and put this stance as its first priority in 
national policy, and had bitter experiences with the Soviet Union during the 
Korean War and the KAL 007 incident, the Russian threat has often been 
seen as a distant, almost second hand danger to many South Koreans.89 
Concurment with these Russian developments, South Korea expressed 
its   self-confidence   and   flexibility   in   foreign   policy  by   announcing   in 
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November 1990 that she would close ten window dressing-type small ROK 
embassies by 1992,90 and expressed its desire to join the UN General 
Assembly whether North Korea opposed it or not. having lost its Soviet 
support network, North Korea had no choice except to follow South Korea 
in joining the United Nations   simultaneously in September 1991.9i 
Japan, though it lost in its bid to host the Olympics in Nagoya, fully 
supported South Korea with the hopes that it would be helpful in reducing 
tensions on the Korean Peninsula. But, as soon as the relationship between 
South Korea and the Soviet Union was revealed, Japan's position changed 
rapidly. There were two kinds of trends of thought in Japan; one is 
optimistic, the other is negative.92 Some were optimistic on the grounds 
that rapprochement between South Korea and the Soviet Union would 
contribute to the resolution of territorial disputes between Japan and the 
Soviet Union. Particularly, progressive intellectuals welcomed the 
rapprochement not only because it would provide a stabilizing factor in the 
Asia-Pacific region, but also because it would constitute the termination of 
the post-World War II system. In their eyes, the adversarial relationship 
between South Korea and the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union and the 
Soviet occupation of Japan's Northern Territories were two sides of the 
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same situation. Therefore, the diplomatic normalization between South 
Korea and the Soviet Union meant to them the possible Soviet return of the 
Kurile islands to Japan.93 
But others were concerned about the possible negative impact on 
Japan of the rapprochement. They were particularly concerned about the fact 
that an improvement of South Korean-Soviet relations, even if it did not 
have any explicit anti-Japan implications, might weaken Japan's position in 
its dealings with the Soviet Union on the issue of the Northern Territories. 
They firmly believed that it was the Soviet Union rather than Japan that was 
more interested in improving relations between the two countries. In order 
to overcome domestic economic difficulties, the Soviet Union was seen in 
a desperate situation to secure Japan's economic assistance. But because of 
the developments in South Korean-Soviet relations, it became difficult for 
Japan to avoid applying the principle of seikei bunri (seperating economics 
from politics) to the Soviet Union. In their eyes, the South Korean approach 
was viewed not only as a policy of driving a wedge between Japan and the 
Soviet Union, but also as a policy of bonding with the Soviet Union to 
contain Japan's influence in East Asia. 
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To Japanese government officials, the summit meeting between Roh 
and Gorbachev was received as a shock not only because they did not expect 
such a sudden breakthrough in Seoul-Moscow relations, but also because 
they were not consulted about, or informed of, the meetings in advance. 
Japanese political leaders began to feel upstaged by South Korea in dealing 
with Moscow. It was in such a context that Japan began to play the North 
Korean card in countering South Korean diplomatic moves.94 
When the Japanese government was considering upgrading ties with 
Seoul in 1989, it was exploring the chances of a diplomatic breakthrough 
with Pyongyang. Prime Minister Takeshita expressed Japan's interest in 
having normalization talks with North Korea on March 20 by calling North 
Korea by its official title. But it was immediately after the Roh-Gorbachev 
meeting of June 5, 1990 that the Japanese government expressed publicly its 
more concrete official position concerning Japanese-North Korean diplomatic 
talks. Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu made it clear that his government would 
make contact with North Korea without any precondition attached, and 
would help facilitate the proposed trip to Pyongyang by the LDP delegation 
headed by Shin Kanemaru in order to make it materialize as soon as 
possible.95   Kanemaru   visited   Pyongyang   in   September   1990   as   the 
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representative of the LDP and expressed his eagerness to normalize 
relationship with Pyongyang by voicing his support for an apology for 
Japan's past behavior and compensation in favor of North Korea. After a 
series of discussions, the Japanese delegation issued a joint declaration with 
the Korea Worker's Party (actually North Korea's official representative) on 
September 28, 1990. In the eight-point declaration, the parties urged Japan 
to apologize "for the unhappiness and suffering caused to the Korean people 
during the 36 years of colonial rule." They agreed that Japan should 
compensate North Korea not only for the damage caused during colonial 
rule but also for the "losses suffered by the Korean people in the 45 years" 
since the end of the World War II. The declaration stipulated that 
delegations would urge their respective governments to initiate diplomatic 
talks in November 1990, to work toward establishing diplomatic ties as soon 
as possible, and called for Japan and North Korea to set up satellite 
communications links and inaugurate direct flights between the two 
countries.96 He also informed North Korean leaders that Japan would 
recognize that "there is only one Korea." As expected, North Korea 
responded to his initiatives enthusiastically, agreeing to release the two 
Japanese seamen, and subsequently invited the LDP to attend the 45th 
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anniversary of the founding of the Korean Workers' Party. The LDP sent 
Mr. Ozawa, the Secretary General of the Party.97 
South Korean reaction was that, in case Japan provided massive 
compensation and economic assistance to North Korea, it would have not 
only a negative impact upon the inter-Korea talks, but also would make it 
more difficult for the realization of peaceful reunification of Korea. Almost 
automatically, the rapprochement came to be suspected as a reflection of 
Japan's two-Korea policy which intended to prolong Korean division. In 
fact, many Japanese have harbored doubts about the desirability of the two 
Koreas becoming one, though Tokyo and most Japanese political leaders say 
they support that goal. This duality, and Korean suspicions about Japanese 
intentions, were crystallized in the fall of 1990 when a well-known author 
and TV personality, Tanemura Kenichi, reportedly said, "An all-out 
invasion of Japan by Korea is inevitable if Korea is unified... therefore it is 
in Japan's best interest to help North Korea economically so the Korean 
Peninsula remains divided as now."98 This comment caused controversy in 
South Korea and denials by Tanemura, but it symbolized the suspicions that 
exist on both sides. 
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Fortunately, however, mutual suspicion was eased by the more 
matured attitudes of each side. South Koreans believed that there was a 
strong possibility that the rapprochement between Japan and North Korea 
might serve to resolve the North Korean problem and it would be helpful to 
reduce "the unification bill". Therefore, in the long run, the rapprochement 
may benefit South Korea. This feeling is reinforced by Japan's sensitivity 
to both U.S desires that Tokyo not undermine Seoul and more importantly, 
Tokyo's anxiety about North Korea's nuclear potential. 
Since normalization, the relationship between South Korea and Japan 
has shifted from confrontation over the ghosts of the historical past to a 
relationship of mutual adjustment of national interests. In security terms, 
historically Japanese have felt insecurity not about Koreans themselves, but 
about the possibility the Korean Peninsula could come under the control of 
a powerful enemy. During the Cold War era the Japanese security 
perception of the Korean Peninsula evolved into more pragmatic terms to 
meet its own national interests. During the 1950s and the early 1960s, Japan 
had tried not to be involved Cold War politics and narrowed its national 
interest to economic development. Thus, as long as the United States was 
responsible for South Korea's defense from the communist threat, Japan had 
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no need to support South Korea strongly. But, as the United States' 
commitments lessened in the Korean Peninsula and as the threats from the 
communists were strengthened, Japan expressed its support for South Korea. 
Since the early 1970s, Japan started to implement a more autonomous 
foreign and security policy resulting from the perceived declining credibility 
of U.S. superiority, and the detente between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. 
This policy shift led to increased Japanese contacts with North Korea which 
was criticized by South Koreans as equidistance diplomacy. Following the 
turning point of the Seoul Olympics, Japanese security perceptions of the 
Korean Peninsula changed fundamentally. While they did not see a 
significant security threat arising from a renewed Korean war, the Japanese 
started to feel security threats from Koreans themselves. As early as the 
early 1970s, some South Korean industries such as construction and 
shipbuilding, became major competitors of Japanese industries in trade 
markets. This trend expanded rapidly to other industries(automobile and 
electronics). Moreover, South Korea's Northern Politics was far ahead of 
the Japanese in dealing with the Soviet Union and east European countries. 
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In sum, it seems that Japanese started to feel that South Korea was a 
competitor rather than the country which needs Japanese help, like the U.S. 
has felt about Japan since the late 1960s. 
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IV. THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 
A. THE CHANGES OF WORLD CIRCUMSTANCES 
The collapse of the Soviet Union signalled the end of the Cold War, 
the end of the superpower rivalry for power and influence, the end of the 
ideological conflict between Capitalism and Communism, and above all, the 
end of bipolarity in world politics. As a result of this change, "complexity, 
uncertainty, and unpredictability" now best describse the post-Cold War 
world politics." 
Generally speaking, there are two different views about the prospects 
for peace and stability in the post-Cold War world. The first is put forward 
by the realist school of international relations. They are arguing that the 
superpower rivalry of the Cold War years played a unique, stabilizing role 
by forestalling regional conflict and inter-state rivalry. With the end of the 
East-West confrontation, these forces will now be free to play themselves 
out.100 
In contrast, the second view postulates a relatively benign era in the 
offing. It points to the growing trend towards economic interdependence as 
a force for political stability and holds out the hope that politico-economic 
arrangements will ultimately supersede politico-strategic considerations as 
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the rationale for security regimes.101 
If we regard "ideological confrontation, superpower rivalry, and 
priority of military issues over other factors in world politics," as the major 
forces which had ruled the Cold War politics, what forces will influence the 
post-Cold War world politics? According to John Lewis Gaddis, these will 
be the forces of integration and fragmentation. The forces of integration- 
economic, technological and political-- are "breaking down barriers that 
have historically separated nations and peoples in such diverse areas as 
politics, economics, religion, technology and culture."102 At the same 
time, however, forces of fragmentation or disintegration are also active in 
the form of nationalism, religion, ethnicity and language.103 
B. OVERALL IMPACT ON THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION 
Based on Gaddis' argument, the positive factors to the stability and 
peace of the Asia-Pacific region are as follows: the ascendancy of 
geoeconomics over geopolitics, growing interdependence among nation 
states, and expanding democracy. The economic inefficiency of the Soviet 
Union is one of the key factors which led to the withdrawal of it from the 
superpower competition and the end of the Cold War. The economic success 
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of the NICs and Japan has not only enhanced their international stature, but 
has also shifted the regional balance of power in their favor. Put it this way, 
economic strength rather than military capability, a country's GNP and per 
capita income rather than the number of nuclear missiles and men under 
arms, have turned out to be the key determinants of a country's overall 
standing in the community of nations. Economic interests are surely one of 
the key factors which contributed to turning former enemies(e.g. China and 
Indonesia, Russia, South Korea, and Taiwan) into friends. As a result of 
these facts, Asian nations seem to realize that, as Paul Kennedy has argued, 
the countries which are closed to outside influences inevitably fall behind the 
countries open to such influences.104 Further in today's interdependent 
world, no country can afford to isolate itself from the rest of the world for 
very long. All countries have come to depend for their own prosperity upon 
the prosperity of others to a greater extent than the past.105 In line with 
this, all countries in the Asia-Pacific- from India to Vietnam and from 
North Korea to Cambodia- are trying to develop their economy like the 
NICs. Thus, geoeconomics has come to outweigh, even eclipse, geopolitics 
in the Asia-Pacific region. 
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The second trend of development is that transnational actors, such as 
multinational corporations and global trade agreements such as the GATT, 
pose a bigger challenge to the sovereignty of nation-states than any other 
institutions. This is so because the problems of economic development, 
environmental safety and national security can no longer be resolved at the 
nation-state level but only through cooperation with other states at the 
regional and global levels. The revolution of communications and 
information technology has helped to establish 'people-to-people and 
organization-to-organization' linkages that bypass the state, circumscribe its 
areas of direct control, and weaken its role in international relations. 
Therefore, the possibility of evolving security dilemmas between nation- 
states caused by wrong information decreased significantly.106 Following 
this movement, Asian states are moving toward the development of an 
APEC that would be like the EC and NAFTA. APEC member nations 
agreed to establish a free trade area by 2010(industrialized countries), and 
2020(developing countries).107 
The third trend of change is the expanding wave of democracy in the 
Asia-Pacific region. Rapid economic and technological development in East 
Asia  laid  the  economic  foundation  for democracy by  the  late   1980s. 
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Confronted with new demands for political reform and democracy from their 
publics, the ruling elites of Taiwan, Singapore, the Philippines, and South 
Korea have been forced to undertake democratic reforms. Everywhere in 
Asia-from Seoul to Dacca—the younger generation, emboldened by the 
collapse of the totalitarian regimes in the former Soviet bloc, has been in the 
forefront of political, and economic, and social reform. 
As a result of the end of bipolarity, there are also new threats to peace 
and security in the region. The United States may be the sole superpower 
of the world after the Soviet Union's disintegration, but the significance of 
its pre-eminent status has diminished. Its capacity to be a 'globo-cop' is in 
question as its economic capability and its willingness wane. As a result of 
diminishing U.S. role in security terms in Asia, the fear of a potential power 
vacuum has arisen, and this fear has developed into the question of which 
country will fill the vacuum. While Asian countries fear China's emergence 
as the sole strategic hegemon in the region in the long-run, and while they 
regard Japan similarily in economic terms, they are worrying about 
increased confusion in the post-Cold War world system. 
The possibility of growing rivalry for regional supremacy among and 
between neighboring countries, especially between China, India, and Japan, 
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increases the potential for instability in the Asia-Pacific region. China and 
Japan, while they need each other for their economic development, have 
often expressed their worries about each other's increasing military 
capability, especially about their naval capability. Small states compared to 
China, India, and Japan, also, are moving toward increasing their military 
capability to defend their own national interests for themselves. 
Economic competition, with a proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, also has contributed to instability in the region. The disputes 
over the Spratly Islands among the concerned countries are actually induced 
by the competition over the control over energy producing resources. The 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the post-Cold War era poses 
another serious challenge to the region's peace and stability. While China 
and India have developed their nuclear weaponry capability to be included 
in the superpower status, Pakistan and North Korea are trying to develop 
their nuclear weapons in order seek a security guarantee from adversary 
states. How North Korea's nuclear issue is solved may significantly 
influence future strategic uncertainty in the region. 
Asia also can not escape from the type of ethno-religious conflicts 
experienced in the Bosnian, Somalian, and Rwandan conflicts. There is 
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significant concern that the separatist aspirations of Kashmir in India, Sind 
in Pakistan, Tibet and Xinjiang in China, and East Timor in Indonesia are 
now bound to be exacerbated. 
In sum, the end of the Cold War caused Asian nations to build strong 
nation states which can be self-relient regarding their security concerns. To 
achieve this goal, they are focusing national energy on developing their 
economies by adopting the experiences of Japan and NICs as their models. 
C. THE RISE OF JAPAN AS A POST-COLD WAR POWER 
Japan's emergence as an economic superpower is one of the key 
features of the post-Cold War era along with the collapse of the former 
Soviet Union. One of the most obvious indicators to show Japan's economic 
performance is the changing value of Yen. The exchange rate of Yen against 
the U.S. Dollar shifted from 360 to 1 in 1970 to 100 in 1994. Japan's GNP 
surpassed that of Italy in 1966, England in 1967, France in 1969, and 
Germany in 1969. Japan's GDP jumped from 8.4 percent in 1960 and 20.2 
percent in 1970 to 60 percent of the United States' figure in 1991.108 Japan 
is the biggest creditor country, with about $400 billion of net credit at the 
end of 1992. The trade surplus of Japan exceeded $130 billion in 1992, 
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while the United States has come to have the world's largest trade deficit, 
$96 billion in that year.109 The United States trade deficit with Japan 
exceeded $59 billion in 1993. Japan has surely emerged as the second 
largest economy following the United States in the post-Cold War world. 
Region Export Import Balance 
U.S. 95.7 52.2 43.5 
EC 62.4 31.2 31.2 
Middle East 15.2 29.2 -14.0 
S.E. Asia 104.3 57.5 46.8 
L. America 15.8 8.7 7.1 
C.P.E. 14.5 21.2 -6.6 
Africa 5.0 1.7 3.3 
Total 339.6 233.0 106.6 
Tahle 1    Tanan's me jrchandise Trade by Area(1992) (US- , $ billion) 
C.P.E. Centrally Planned Economy, such as China and North Korea. 

















Table 2. Japan's Direct Overseas Investment by Region(April 1981-March 
1993), (US$ billion),   Source: Ministry of Finance, Japan.1" 
Japan not only increased the size of its economy, but also expanded 
its trade boundaries. There is almost no global region which Japan's trade 
1u0 
does not reach. As Table 1 and 2 show, Japan's economy is more deeply 
involved in the world economy that any other country. 
In addition to its vast size and expanded trade boundaries, Japan is 
outstanding in technological performance, too. The ratio of Japan's 
technology exports to technology imports(actually, the ratio of value of 
licensing fees and royalties associated with technology exports and imports) 
has increased from 39.4 percent in fiscal 1975 to 137.8 percent in fiscal 
1989."2 The U.S. national Science Foundation reported in 1988 that 
Japanese firms accounted for the largest single share of foreign-origin U.S. 
patents. Moreover, Japanese-origin U.S. patents were cited more than 
proportionately in other patent applications, an indicator of their high 
quality.113 Other indicators of technological performance also suggest 
considerable Japanese strength. The rate of adoption and intensity of 
utilization of advanced manufacturing technologies (including robotics, 
computer-integrated manufacturing workcells, and flexible manufacturing 
systems) in Japanese manufacturing both exceed the corresponding levels in 
U.S. manufacturing.114 Kim Clark, Takahiro Fujimoto, and others have 
documented the ability of Japanese automotive firms to manufacture one car 
and to bring new models to market more rapidly than U.S. auto firms.IL"' 
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Japan's economic status in Northeast Asia is outstanding. Japan is the 
sole Asian state in the G-7 club. Japan's economy comprised 70.9 percent 
of the entire Asian GNP in 1991. Japan's GDP was five times bigger than 
that of China and South Korea combined in 1992.116 Japan ranks first and 
second in imports and exports respectively as South Korea's trading partner. 
It ranks second as China's import and export partner in 1991. Japan also has 
assumed a major role in foreign aid to Asia, replacing America in the 
1970s. Internationally Japan has intensified its foreign aid to Asia.117 After 
the Plaza Accord in 1985, Japan became the largest investor in Asia. 
Japan's political status has increased considerably from the position 
of the late 1940s, largely due to the success of its economic development 
and foreign aid policy. Japan supports 12.5 percent of the United Nations 
general expenditure in 1992 (The United States' share is 25 percent). 
Japan's overriding economic presence reached the phase of making feasible 
a Yen Bloc, which reminds Asians of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity 
Sphere in the prewar period. At present, the advent of a Yen Bloc looks far 
from imminent, subordinated to the dollar in Asia."8 Nonetheless, several 
factors indicate this direction: an increasing volume of intra-regional trade, 
the    Yen's    prevailing    financial    status    in    the    region,    and    the 
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internationalization of Japanese finance. It is analogous to the Japanese term 
"flying geese," with Japan as the leading goose. Were it come true, a Yen 
Bloc would give Japan structural power to affect the monetary and financial 
system in the region, which will assume political implications. 
In military terms, Japan also emerged as a significant player in the 
Asia-Pacific region. Japan's defense expenditure has become the second 
largest in the world as the result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
high value of the Yen. Although the Japanese SDF's size is much smaller 
than that of the military in China, North Korea, and even South Korea, its 
capability is estimated as the most modern military in Asia. When we 
consider navies only, the Japanese Maritime SDF is surely more powerful 
than that of China.119 
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V. PROSPECTS FOR JAPAN'S POST-COLD WAR 
SECURITY POLICY 
As international circumstances and Japan's national interests have 
changed, Japanese debates over defense policy have evolved from an 
absolute renunciation of military capability, to offensive vs defensive 
questions, and to denying dispatch of its SDF abroad vs dispatching it. Now, 
in the post-Cold War era, there might be many factors which justify Japan's 
more active role beyond its economic role in world politics. Japan opened 
its door to participate with military capability in international relations by 
dispatching its SDF to the Gulf and Cambodia under the auspice of the UN. 
During the Cold War era, despite the United States pressing Japan 
to increase its military capability, few East Asian countries worried about 
Japanese militarization under the U.S-Japan security treaty. But the end of 
the Cold War made many countries in the region concerned about Japan's 
future direction. Moreover, Japan's emergence as an economic superpower 
with the most advanced technology, including military technology, hightened 
concerns about Japan's intentions. 
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A. CONDITIONS 
1. Strategic Factors 
a. Japan-U.S. Relations 
Japanese postwar security perceptions have developed basically 
within the scheme of the Yoshida Doctrine- depending on the U.S. for its 
external security, and pursuing its economic growth. This strategy made 
Japanese believe that their security mainly derives from economic sources 
rather than military sources. Because of this Japanese position, there have 
been significant differences in the two nations' view of the threats facing 
Japan and how they should be coped with strategically. 
Earlier in the postwar period, Japan followed the U.S. perception 
of security issues without much conflict. The United States had enough 
military superiority to deal with any threats, and a well-defined role in the 
Western Pacific region as a self-appointed guarantor of the stability, which 
meshed very well with Japan's preference for its benefactor to assume such 
duties.120 The designation by the United States of the Soviet Union as the 
major external power threatening the peace and stability of the region did 
not bother the Japanese, who tended to dislike and distrust the Soviets for 
historical reasons. Besides, from a Japanese point of view the Soviets were 
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not a direct threat in Asia, presumably because of the steadfast U.S. 
involvement in the region, so Japan discreetly followed Washington's 
definition of the threat. Some Japanese had doubts about the U.S. emphasis 
on China as an instrument of Soviet-sponsored threats, but most decided it 
was prudent to accept that interpretation as well. The Japanese sensed a 
remote danger in regard to neighboring North Korea, but even then the 
threat was not a direct danger to Japan so much as to South Korea, which 
served as something of a buffer state for Japan. Thus, the Japanese did not 
perceive a serious threat to them from any direction but were willing to 
acknowledge the existence of an overall threat to the Western alliance, of 
which they were anxious to become an integral part of because of the 
enormous economic benefits and the defense shield that would be provided 
by the United States.121 
Declining U.S. credibility resulting from the Vietnam War and 
the Nixon Doctrine, combined with its strong pressure on Japan to share 
defense burdens, Japan's resource vulnerability acknowledged by the two oil 
crises, and the decisive buildup of the Soviets' navy in the late 1970s and 
the early 1980s in the Western Pacific, forced Japanese to draw its own 
security   picture   escaping   from  the   complete  U.S.   security   umbrella. 
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Japanese responded to those threats through their concept of "comprehensive 
security." During the Summer of 1980, a private advisory body established 
by Prime Minister Ohira released in English its Report on Comprehensive 
National Security. The authors of this report explained the political, 
economic, and military basis for Japan's stake in international security and 
argued that Japan could best bear its proper share of mutual burdens by 
becoming more active on all three fronts, but that Japan should emphasize 
its economic skills and minimize its military contribution. Further, because 
it was restrained by legal and moral limitations, Japan should play only a 
supportive role militarily within very narrow definitions.122 This privately 
produced proposal was rapidly incorporated into Tokyo's agenda by an 
October announcement that the government would create an official council 
by year's end to study comprehensively the relationship between defense and 
a wide range of economic issues that affected Japan's national security, 
broadly defined. 
Then, what is the meaning of Comprehensive Security? When the 
debate over comprehensive security was engaged, Prime Minister Ohira 
told the LDP officials that "the United States is no longer a superpower but 
has become one of the powers, and the era has passed when one can depend 
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on the United States for everything."123 Thus, the very meaning of 
Comprehensive Security is that Japan will take a more active role in 
international politics for both its security and world peace with all means 
possible whether they are economic, military, or political. This Japanese 
strategy, in terms of foreign policy, was elaborated into Ohira's notion of 
a Pacific Basin economic community as the basis for a forward-looking 
diplomatic agenda for the 1980s, and has developed into its active foreign 
involvement by means of prime ministers' visits, and economic assistance 
to those countries which have strategic importance for Japanese national 
security. 
While Japan was opposed to American pressure to increase 
Japan's military capability to a scale large enough to meet the Soviet 
Union's military threat to the region, it started to develop its military 
capability so that it could meet its narrowly defined national interests, such 
as defending Japan from conventional threats, not from the threats of that 
the United States perceived— namely the threat to regional SLOCs. 
Although Japan adopted a more active policy under the name of 
Comprehensive Security in dealing with foreign and security policies, Japan 
did not deviate much from the Yoshida Doctrine. Comprehensive security 
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has become a rationale for Japan to rely on the United States to shore up the 
most difficult portions of Japan's broad-based security, while Tokyo copes 
very cautiously with other elements.124 Tokyo's efforts at coping with 
these  elements  have  been  overwhelmingly  economic,   focusing  on  the 
positive geopolitical atmospherics that can be achieved through trade and 
investment. This accounts for Japan's extreme sensitivity to any signs that 
Japan's economic  activities  abroad are engendering frictions.125 Tokyo 
arduously pursues harmony in these relationships, fearing that any severe 
disruptions would undermine the comprehensiveness of Japan's security in 
ways that might compel it to invoke the less benign portions of its security 
doctrine. Although Japan under Prime Minister Nakasone strengthened its 
military capability in order to cope with  growing military threats from the 
Soviet Union's large scale navy buildup,  it did not go far beyond the 
economic centered comprehensive security concept.   This tells us that the 
priority of Japanese security perceptions focuses on its economic sources 
rather than a military threat. In line with this, through the Cold War era, 
although Japan regarded the Soviet Union as a major military threat, Japan 
did not feel it so much as the United States did. This Japanese behavior 
resulted from its narrowly defined threat perception strengthened by its 
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economic success which induced the conflicts with the United States over the 
issues of being a "free rider," and "burden sharing." Conversely, the 
heightened criticism from the United States over Japanese "free rider" 
behavior that started from as early as the early 1970s, made the Japanese 
doubt that the main source of the economic threat was the United States. 
The end of the Cold War had a different influence on threat 
perceptions for both Japan and the United States. The United States no 
longer considers Russia a threat, and envisions that it would have a long 
time to prepare for any new threat to arise which would be comparable to 
that of the former Soviet Union.126 In general, Japan also feels much less 
anxiety about the threat of the former Soviet Union, now Russia. However, 
while the United States seems largely prepared to view the Cold War as 
history, especially in terms of a U.S.-USSR conflict, Japan still clutches at 
its peculiar remnant of the Cold War. Part of Japan's rationale has to do 
with its territorial claims, but at deeper level there seems to be residual 
Russo-Japanese distrust, which does not permit Japan's leaders to put the 
Cold War into a historical file and walk away from it.127 
In terms of economic security, the end of the Cold War 
strengthened Japanese feeling that they had been in the right position which 
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emphasized economic and political means rather than military means in 
dealing with security issues, and, therefore that the United States has 
become the main source of a kind of threat to Japan. During the Cold War 
era, U.S. pressure on Japan focused on increasing Japanese defense 
expenditure to share the burden of containing the Soviet Union. As a result 
of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States lost not only its cause 
to press Japan on burden sharing, but also its reason to stay in Japan as a 
security guarantor against the Soviet Union. Moreover, the United States 
starts to feel new 'threats' from Japan in both economic and military terms. 
As a result, the United States has stepped up its pressure on Japan to cope 
with economic issues using its power, while checking Japanese emergence 
as a military superpower with various means. Despite persistent and 
growing economic conflicts between Japan and the United States, there are 
various reasons they need each other to cope with the post-Cold War 
uncertainties. 
Now, as a result of the end of the confrontation with the Soviet 
Union, the United States is no longer urging Japan to bear more of a 
defense burden, and is doing somewhat less in the Pacific region. The 
United States is signaling that the choice about taking a more active military 
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role is basically up to Japan. In the short term, the United States is asking 
Japan to do more, as in the case of the Gulf War. But Washington is also 
wary about letting Japan fill any new vacuum, especially as other Asians 
warn about their worries over Japanese militarism. Official American policy 
is to move to a more flexible and thinly spread force in the Pacific which 
uses smaller facilities around East Asia, and not to withdraw entirely.128 
In line with this, according to Olsen, American officials wanted to 
perpetuate the U.S. role in Japan because of: (1) the utility of American 
bases in Japan for U.S. strategy; (2) the economic and political leverage that 
Japanese dependence upon the United States created for Washington; (3) the 
financial and technological roles Japan could play as an 'ally' of sorts; (4) 
the potential Japan possesses to become a more meaningful security partner; 
and (5) recognition that the anxieties of Japan's neighbors might be 
warranted and, therefore, it might be better to keep an American leash on 
Japanese potentials.129 In general, the United States' stake in the Asia 
Pacific region has grown consistently since the end of World War II, and 
the size of the trade with its Asian partners surpassed that of European 
partners in 1985. In January 1992, President George Bush, in a news 
conference during his visit to the Asian Pacific region, emphasized that the 
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United States is a "Pacific power," and he asserted that "we are going to 
stay involved in the Pacific." 13° The Clinton Administration's active 
participation in the APEC meetings in Seattle and Jakarta tells us that the 
United States stake in Asia is now almost parallel to that of Europe. The 
United States seems to worry about the rise of any 'hegemonic power' 
hostile to the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. This includes 
Japanese hegemony or Chinese hegemony, and it is especially concerned 
about a power combination of the two countries. Thus, the United States has 
no reason to withdraw its military from Japan. Further, the United States 
may try to utilize conflicts beween and among neighboring countries around 
Japan in order to support its objective of staying in Japan. 
Again, according to Olsen, Japan also wants to perpetuate the 
U.S. role because it is:(l) economically beneficial; (2) militarily beneficial 
by meshing Japan into a global security network without obligating Tokyo 
to do anything other than to help defend Japan; and (3) politically beneficial 
by minimizing the anxieties of Japan's neighbours who were(and are) 
concerned about what Japan might do if it were not constrained by linkage 
to the United States. Therefore, Japan has no reason to increase its military 
capability to the degree which makes the United States and neighbouring 
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countries in Asia worry about its intentions in relations with the United 
States. However, Japan propably shall increase its military capability to the 
degree which satisfies the United States demands and increase its share of 
the expense of maintaining United States forces in Japan. 
b. Japan-Russia Relations 
Japan's relations with Russia during the twentieth century, have 
been marked by animosity, rivalry, mutual suspicion, conflict and disputes. 
As Stuart Harris has noted : 
The animosity stemmed from the competition for power and 
influence in North East Asia at the turn of the century that led 
to the 1904-5 Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese invasion of the 
Soviet Far East in 1918-22, the battle on the Soviet borders in 
1930s, the link with Nazi Germany in the Germany-Japanese 
Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936, and the events of W.W II.131 
The legacy of mistrust, suspicion and frosty relations not only survived the 
end of the World War II but intensified during the Cold War period because 
of the Soviet's attitude toward Japanese prisoners of war, and its occupation 
of the Southern Kurile Islands, which the Japanese consider to be their 
territories. 
During the Cold War, the resolution of the territorial dispute was 
made difficult by a combination of diplomatic,  strategic, and domestic- 
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political factors. For one thing, the security considerations and political 
alliances of the Cold War precluded the possibilities of a softening of their 
respective positions on the territorial dispute. Under Article 9 of the Soviet- 
Japanese Joint  Declaration  of  19  October   1956,   which  restored their 
diplomatic relations, the Soviet Union agreed to return two of the   four 
Northern Territories, the Habomai Islands and Shikotan, after the conclusion 
of a Moscow-Tokyo peace treaty.  However,  American influence  over 
Japanese policy towards the Soviet Union was an important factor in the 
failure  to  reach  an  agreement over  a peace treaty  in   1956.132  From 
Washington's perspective, Japanese concessions on the territorial dispute or 
the conclusion of a Moscow-Tokyo peace treaty would have seriously 
undermined the US-Japanese Security Alliance. The Kurile dispute provided 
both   the   conservatives   in   the   governing   LDP   and   successive   U.S. 
administrations a reason and a cause to gain Japanese public support for the 
U.S.-Japan Security Alliance and retain substantial U.S. military presence 
in the area. This was required because of the pacificism and anti-military 
tendency of the postwar Japanese people. As Edward Olsen realistically put 
it: if the islands dispute had not existed the United States would have had to 
invent the issue. The same could be said of the Japanese government.1" 
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During the Cold War, the territorial dispute became a symbol of 
the Japanese Cold War. It almost made it impossible for Japan and the 
Soviet Union to cooperate in developing the Soviet Far East, although there 
have been strong economic common interests. The cold war between Japan 
and the Soviet Union was at height when Prime Minister Nakasone stated 
that Japan would serve as an unsinkable carrier for American forces in the 
Pacific during his visit to Washington in 1983. 
When the Cold War was in its last phase, although Moscow's 
strong desire to develop its Far East through cooperating with East Asia's 
advanced countries forced the Soviet Union to normalize its diplomatic 
relations with South Korea and to improve its relations with China, it failed 
to achieve its ultimate goal-- large scale economic aid from Japan in 
exchange for returning the Northern Territories. Japan and the Soviet 
Union(Russia)'s failure was largely due to their domestic problems rather 
than their wrongly directed foreign policies. 
Ozawa Ichiro as a Secretary General of the LDP traveled to 
Moscow for a March 25 1990 meeting with Gorbachev and discussion of a 
$26 billion aid package to be activated simultaneously with a peace 
settlement. However, Gorbachev feared that returning the islands to Japan 
117 
would set a precedent for other countries from which the Russians took 
territory during World War II to make their own territorial demands on the 
USSR. Moreover, he had to mollify the independence movements of many 
of the Soviet republics and deal with the spoiling tactics of the Russian 
Federation President, Boris Yeltsin, who stated that there would be no more 
Alaskas. Thus, The Gorbachev-Kaifu summit in April 1991 failed to 
produce a resolution to the disputes. 
President Yeltsin also failed to deal with the disputes. Like 
Gorbachev, Yeltsin has tried to deal with the territorial dispute in exchange 
for Japanese large scale economic aid. However, Yeltsin had to cancel his 
planned visits to Japan two times, in September 1992 and in May 1993, 
because of domestic problems. In addition to Gorbachev's obstacles, the 
increasing status of the public and nationalism combined with the efforts of 
the politicians to score political points by using the territorial dispute issue, 
gave Yeltsin no choice except to maintain the status quo. In Japan, Yeltsin's 
behavior stirred up memories of past wars and of past humiliations. To the 
Japanese, Moscow's gradual posture, or step-by-step approach, represented 
nothing more than a delaying tactic to induce Japanese money without a 
resolution on the territorial issue. Although the economics stakes are high 
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for Japan in the Russian Far East,134 the Japanese seems to prefer national 
prestige to those interests. Moreover, the Japanese seem to believe that 
Russia is in absolute need of Japanese hard currency with its abundant 
experience and capability to aid the development of Russian Siberia and the 
Far East. Thus, there is no need for Japan to conclude a peace treaty with 
Russia in a hurry. 
On balance, the development of the Russian Far East requires 
abundant capital, advanced technology and skilled labor. These are not 
available in the Russian Far East, nor can the central government afford 
them. On whom then can the Russian Far East count? It will be its 
economically prosperous neighbors, such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan. 
In view of this economic reality, the Russian leadership seems to realize that 
the only viable way to develop its Far East is to make the best use of the 
economic dynamism of the Asia-Pacific. It is widely acknowledged now that 
the development of Siberian and Far Eastern natural resources in an 
environmentally sustainable manner will depend crucially on the economic 
assistance and direct participation of Japan, South Korea, and other Asia- 
Pacific countries.135 But, when we consider the size of South Korea's 
economy compared to that of Japan and its possible burden of unification, 
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there will be no alternatives except Japan. Therefore, until Russian domestic 
policy takes the right track, it seems that a significant breakthrough between 
Japan and Russia would be impossible. But, once the Russian government 
has success in dealing with its domestic problems and it starts to see the 
territorial disputes in a more pragmatic view, there would be no obstacles 
to the problem's solution. 
During the Cold War especially since the early 1980s, Japan 
regarded the Soviet Union as the main military threat to their security. As 
the Cold War ended, Japanese threat perception from the Soviet Union, now 
Russia, changed considerably. It seems that the collapse of the former Soviet 
Union makes the Japanese feel more free from an imminent Russian military 
threat. In 1984, close to half of the Japanese thought the Soviets posed a 
military threat to Japan, and 42 percent did not. By 1990, the majority of 
the Japanese(60 percent) were convinced that the Soviet military threat was 
rapidly diminishing, while only 36 percent still held the view that it was not 
on the decline.136 
Apart from this perception by the people, it seems that Russia is 
still a main threat to Japan's security at the Government level. The 1993 
Japanese Defense White Paper, stated: 
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The military forces of Russia are being reduced in General,  
It transferred a considerable portion of these weapons to the 
East of Urals,....Russian forces in the Far East exceed the 
bounds of defense requirements Deployment of Russian 
forces in the Far East is concentrated on areas adjacent to 
Japan,.Japan needs to continue to watch Russian forces in the 
russian Far East region. 137 
Therefore, until the dispute over the Kurile Islands is resolved, 
Japanese threat perceptions of Russia would not be calm. In turn, Japanese 
uneasy relations    with Russia probably will force Japan to maintain its 
military capability to a sizable degree. At the same time, Japan has no 
rationale to shift its economics-oriented foreign policy to a military- oriented 
foreign policy to deal with Russia. 
c. Japan-China Relations 
Until the late 19th century, Japanese society was based on 
Chinese culture, technology, and even political ideology. As the Japanese 
started to develop their country to catch up with the more advanced western 
countries, and when it tried to establish an empire through out the whole of 
Asia, Japan-China relations worsened. While post-World War II relations 
between China and Japan have been conducted under the Cold War logic 
in general. Sino-Japanese relations had different characteristics than that of 
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the United States and the Soviet Union relationship. China has rarely been 
threatening toward Japan. Japan also has tried to maintain its good 
relationship with China, at least in economic terms. These 'good' relations 
were further strengthened by the normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic 
ties in 1972. Both China's desire to check Soviet hegemony and Japan's 
desire to expand its economic interests in China were served by the 
normalized relationship. 
China is in the midst of its long struggle to catch up with the first 
rank nations of the world-a group to which it feels it should belong. The 
current ideological line is essentially Deng Xiaoping's pragmatism--"if it 
works, do it" or "if it catches mice, what difference whether the cat is black 
or white." This pragmatism has developed into China's "one center, two 
basic points" policy. The one center is that China must modernize as fast as 
possible. The two basic points are "economic reform full speed ahead" and 
"open up to the outside world." In order to achieve this goal China needs 
peace and stability in the world, especially around China. Deng Xiaoping 
said that "a peaceful environment is, naturally, a precondition, we expect at 
least seventy years of peace."138 
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The collapse of the Soviet Union has changed China's security 
perception considerably. China gained double benefits from the end of the 
Cold War. The threat from the Soviet Union to China was reduced greatly, 
almost disappearing. The shift of the world's concern from military 
confrontation to economic competition increased China's security 
considerably and is the best condition for China to achieve its national goal- 
" modernization "--without wasting resources to a maintain huge defense 
capability. 
China often played off the Cold War bi-polarity exceptionally 
well. Therefore, the Soviet collapse meant to China that it had lost one lever 
to counter the other superpower. China was obliged to cope with the sole 
superpower, the United States on its own. China seems to see the present 
unipolarity of the world as more difficult, but less dangerous than the bi- 
polarity. The sanctions on China by Western countries led by the United 
States following the Tienanmen square incident, the Gulf War, and U.S. 
pressure on China's human right issues, do not threaten a nuclear holocaust 
but they do not end China's deep-seated quarrels with the lone remaining 
hegemon—the United States. 
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The Chinese feel uneasy about the formation of economic blocs. 
The emergence of Japan and European countries as well as the United States 
as economic giants make Chinese leaders feel that China again is left as a 
second class country, but they find their confidence being restored by the 
spectacular progress that China is making. 
Although China's security perceptions have changed significantly, 
the picture of China's foreign policy has not changed much from that of the 
Cold War era:   "anti-hegemony,  peaceful  coexistence,  and third  world 
champion."139 Since the late 1960s, China had used its "anti-hegemony" 
policies to check the Soviet expansionism. But now, China is using this 
policy to check U.S. hegemony. China also has expressed its support   for 
the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty not for the purpose of countering   Russia, 
but to check Japan's militarization. In line with this, the Chinese seek to 
exploit the contradictions which have surfaced recently between Japan and 
the United States over economic issues in order to enhance China's national 
interests and gain room for maneuver in Sino-US-Japanese relations.    In 
other words, following the end of Cold War's triangular diplomacy, Chinese 
policy makers are keen to play the Japan card in their bilateral relations with 
the United States. 
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While China is making good relations with Japan to counter the 
United States' hegemony, its concern over Japan's possible emergence as a 
military superpower is also keen. An overwhelming majority of Chinese 
policy makers and analysts fear Japan's expansionist ambitions and want to 
keep a safe distance. Of particular concern to Beijing is the extent to which 
Japan's already predominant economic power will be translated into political 
influence and military power, and the challenge this might pose for China's 
own aspirations for political leadership.140 An activist diplomacy and the 
attainment of great-Power status by Japan -- on a par with the United States 
and Western Europe- would seriously undercut China's regional and global 
influence.141 That is why China views with concern the Japanese demand 
for permanent membership in the UN Security Council, because it will 
undermine China's status as the sole representative of Asian interests in that 
international body. Already Beijing has serious misgivings about Tokyo's 
slow but steady military buildup, and has voiced its concern over the 
dispatch of Japanese troops to Cambodia as part of a UN peacekeeping 
forces.142 Since the bitter memories of Japan's occupation of China, 
Korea and other countries in East Asia during the Second World War are 
still fresh, there is no enthusiasm in the region for an active Japanese 
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political and military role for fear of a revivalist Japan.143 Nonetheless, 
China attaches great importance to maintaining good relations with Japan in 
order to ensure the further development of mutual economic ties and seeks 
to minimize differences over issues such as Diaoyutai Islands. From 
Beijing's perspective, economic and political ties with Japan not only bring 
it diplomatic gains in the short term but will also help it achieve China's 
long-term goal of restoring its grandeur. For the moment, therefore, China 
needs Japan at least as much as Japan needs China. 
Japan's long historical relations with China and its position in 
Asia, force Japan have to maintain good relations with China. When Japan 
negotiated with the United States for the San Francisco peace treaty, it was 
very reluctant to recognize the Republic of China in Taiwan as a sole 
legitimate government in China. Although Japan had to recognize the ROC 
on Taiwan as the representative of China under the strong pressure of the 
United States from 1951 to 1972, it tried to maintain good relations with 
China, at least on economic terms through its Seikei Bunri(sepzrate economy 
from politics) policy. Japan was the first major power to lift its economic 
sanctions on China following the Tienanmen incident. As a result of this 
policy, at present, Japan became the largest investor in China, and the 
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largest trade partner with China in 1993. Furthermore, Japan is well aware 
that it can not do much without China's cooperation in international politics. 
China's approval is crucial for Japan to be a permanent member of the UN 
Security Council. 
In security terms, Japanese fundamental perception of China is 
that it is not a maritime power, but a continental one. Japan did not express 
much concern over China's nuclear capability during the Cold War era. 
Japanese shock after President Nixon's visit to China resulted from Japanese 
concerns that the United States might choose China as its ally in Asia in 
exchange for Japan. Nonetheless, Japan had not seen the Chinese as a 
security threat during the Cold War era as long as the United States 
remained in Japan. Japan believed that it could contribute to the maintenance 
of political stability in poor and communist countries through helping their 
economic development. This logic worked well vis-a-vis China during the 
Cold War era. Tokyo's key policy objective is to maintain regional stability 
in order to ensure the safety of vulnerable trade routes and its vast economic 
interests throughout the Asia-Pacific region.144 Political turmoil and 
economic stagnation in China could destabilize the whole region. In sum, 
the Japanese want to see a stable, but not too strong China. 
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And then, what are the reasons for Japan to increase its concern 
over the Chinese military, especially the naval buildup since the end of the 
Cold War? It seems that their priority concern is the protection of the 
SLOCs which are crucial for Japan's national survival, because of its 
dependence on sea transport. However, a different reason might be that the 
Japanese defense establishment needs a 'threat' to get the budgets approved, 
and retain the public's support. Another reason is that Japan wants to avoid 
an arms race with China. China has repeatedly denied its intention to buy 
an aircraft carrier from the Ukraine. One of the reasons for China to quit 
its plan is its concern for the regional naval balance. An advanced country 
such as Japan might be willing to invest in the necessary naval and air 
weapon systems to counter a Chinese naval buildup. China does not have 
any reason to waste its limited national energy, which could be well used for 
its economic development. This logic could be well applied for Japan, too. 
At the moment there is no reason for Japan to be particulary concerned 
about Chinese military interests. And, therefore, there is no reason for Japan 
to embark on a program that would make them a military superpower. 
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2. Economic Factors 
Since Japan's security concern depends so heavily on economic factors 
rather than military ones, the economic conditions of Japan would be very 
crucial indicators for its security policy. The share of Japan in world 
exports and imports is 9.1 and 6.6 percent respectively, which shows how 
big Japan's economy is, and how deeply Japan is involved in world trade. 
The degree of Japan's dependency on imports for its total energy 
requirement was over 83 percent in 1991J45 Moreover, Japan's import 
dependency on natural resources is the highest among OECD countries.146 
Therefore, Japan has no alternative but to depend on foreign trade for its 
economic survival. 
As a result of its steady and high rate of economic growth through the 
1960s and 1970s, Japan's economic behavior has changed significantly since 
the early 1980s. Trade conflicts with major countries resulted from Japan's 
vast trade surplus. Also contributing to the change, Japanese companies 
started to shift from chiefly exporters to true multinationals by increasing 
their foreign direct investment(FDI), which, they believed, would make the 
Japanese overseas position more stable, although it might create its own 
friction. When the 1980s began, Japan barely exported a yen in capital. It 
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had spent most of the postwar decades importing capital to finance its own 
development. However, with the strong Reagan dollar, and with a sharply 
falling budget deficit in Japan, with a rising current account surplus, Japan 
suddenly emerged as the world's single biggest source of capital. By the 
middle of the decade, it also was the largest overseas creditor. In 1985, its 
net exports of long-term capital reached $65 billion; by 1987, they had 



















Table 3. Japan's Trade Surplus and FDI(seIected years)   ($bn) 
Source: Keizai Koho Center, "Japan 1994 an Intentional Comparison." 
Capital exports are important for its security policy because, albeit 
indirectly, they involve two of the key elements of power: influence and 
dependence. They provide influence for those who spend the money and 
dependence for those who receive it. On the other side of coin of FDI, is 
that the spender also has some degree of dependency on the receiver for its 
profit   and   security   of      investment.   Therefore,   Japanese   economic 
dependency on foreign countries would make Japan want to avoid military 
confrontation with most of the major countries. 
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In terms of Japan's economic relations with the United States, Japan 
is also deeply tied with the United States via East Asia's economy. Most of 
the East Asian countries' make profit in their trades with the United States, 
while they have huge trade deficits, (excepting China), with Japan. Japan 
had large surpluses in trade with South Korea($6.5 bn), Taiwan($12.0 bn), 
Hongkong($18.0 bn), and Singapore($9.0 bn) in 1992,148 while the United 
States had substantial deficit with those countries.149 This means that East 
Asian countries import Japanese technology and machinery to make goods 
and export those to the United States. Japan's capability to substitute the 
United States as a market for other Asian countries is in doubt. This reveals 
that Japan has too many risks in its confrontation with the United States- 
for her sake and that of other Asian countries. 
3. Domestic Political Factors 
a. Public Opinion 
Article 9 of Japan's Constitution, the one percent ceiling of 
defense budget, pacificist attitudes of the public, the three non-nuclear 
policies- all have been used to explain Japan's reluctance to re-militarize. 
Among them, public opinion is the key factor to decide changes of those 
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policies. As has been revealed in Chapter III, in general the interpretation 
of Japan's Constitution has been modified into a more realistic school of 
thought. Japanese opinion about its security issue also has moved from an 
extreme leftist position toward a modified rightist position.150 
Two fundamental issues of Japanese debates over their security 
are how far Japan should go in building up its indigenous military 
capabilities, and what kind of defense relationship Japan should have with 
the United States. Four broad schools of thought have dominated Japanese 
debates over these issues.151 The first is represented by proponents of 
"unarmed neutrality (extreme left)." This school of thought was associated 
with the leftist Japan Socialist Party(JSP) and leading Japanese intellectuals 
and trade union organizations. These individuals are distrustful of both the 
Japanese military, which they regard as responsible for Japan's prewar 
expansionism and ultimate catastrophic defeat in World War II, and the 
United States, which they see as using Japan to further America's global 
ambitions. They see no external military threat to Japan's security. Indeed, 
their biggest fear is of the United States "dragging" Japan into an unwanted 
war in pursuit of its strategic objectives. With this orientation, they strongly 
oppose any change in Japan's Constitution, and they seek to reduce the SDF 
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to an "unarmed" or "lightly armed" territorial defense guard sufficient to 
maintain internal security. They also seek the abrogation of the U.S.-Japan 
Security Treaty, the adoption of an absolutely "neutral" foreign policy 
posture to avoid involvement in external disputes and the promotion of 
global disarmament. Although the JSP modified its critical stance, other 
leftists retain these views. 
The second school of thought consists of those who advocate 
Japanese "independence(extreme right)." This school constitutes Japan's 
"Gaullists," a historically small but vocal group of people on the far right 
of the political spectrum who believe that full rearmament is a matter of 
national pride. They regard Russia as Japan's permanent enemy, and China 
as a potential threat and leading rival for influence in Asia. They seek a 
revision of the Constitution and elimination of the full range of 
governmental constraints on Japan's military buildup. The also want to 
revise the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in order to place Japan as an equal of 
the major powers. 
Although these two schools of thought effectively bound the 
range of views in Japan, two other schools, both in the middle, have 
conducted the debate that has been important in policy terms since the early 
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1970s.1''2 One is represented by proponents of "basic defense 
capab\\ity(kibanteki boeiryoku)" This may be regarded as an extension of 
the conservative mainstream in Japan since the days of Prime Minister 
Yoshida in the 1950s. They argue that Japan needs only minimal defense 
capability to deal with limited and small-scale aggression. They support the 
U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. 
While in general following the broad Yoshida line, proponents 
of basic defense capability represent an advance in two respects: (1) they 
postulate for the first time a certain minimum level of defense capability and 
responsibility that Japan needs to take on itself rather than simply relying on 
the United States to provided all of Japan's external security, and (2) they 
accept the need for expanded Japanese efforts toward preserving the U.S.- 
Japan security alliance. The Japanese government adopted this school of 
thought as its official policy in 1976 in the NDPO(Ä>« Keikaku no Taiko). 
Together   with   the   Guidelines   on   U.S.-Japan   Defense   Cooperation 
promulgated in 1978, which provided for expanded Japanese participation 
in military activities with the United States, the NDPO serves as the basic 
documents structuring Japan's defense policy at present. 
134 
The other school of thought that has been important to policy 
making is represented by advocates of "autonomous defense." They are in 
the same position of the proponents of basic defense capability to support the 
U.S.-Japan close defense cooperation, while they argue three key points. 
They argue that Japan should give primary emphasis to its own defense 
efforts and supplement these with U.S. assistance. They reject the idea of 
limited and small-scale aggression as the target of Japan's rearmament and 
call for a more rapid and extensive defense buildup. They reject the use of 
assumptions about international developments and intentions of neighboring 
nations as the basis for estimating Japan's defense need. They argue that 
Japan should buildup its forces as required to deal with the military 
capabilities of potential antagonists. 
The school of thought from the left was at the center of the 
security policy debate until the late 1970s. But from that time each party, 
such as Komeito and JSP, which represent the more pacificist feeling, had 
no choice but to change its key policies for party survival. In November 
1979, Komeito officially announced its support of the Security Treaty with 
the U.S.153 In May 1980, the Socialists also dropped its opposition to the 
Security Treaty with the United States and to the SDF. In 1981, Komeito 
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recognized the SDF as constitutional. Under Prime Minister Nakasone, the 
Japanese government's security policy shifted very much from left to right. 
This strong policy of Nakasone got the large approval of the Japanese public 
by winning in the 1986 general election.The LDP's seats expanded from 
250(48.6 percent support) in 1983 to 300(58.6 percent support) in 1986. The 
Japanese attitude about the Constitution also changed significantly. The 
Japanese support for a revision of the Constitution increased from 28.3 in 
1981 to 50.4 percent in 1993, while opposition to revising the Constitution 
dropped from 55.6 percent in 1986 to 33 percent in 1993.154 
Until the late 1980s, it seemed that Japanese consensus about its 
security policy has become the "autonomous position." But after the end of 
the Cold War, more especially after the Gulf War, Japanese debates about 
its security policy evolved to issues of how deeply Japan should be involved 
in world politics. 
b. Impact of the Gulf War 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and speedy response of the United 
States and Western countries greatly influenced Japanese security concerns. 
The Japanese disagreed among themselves concerning the seriousness of the 
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issue. Setting aside the Japanese hostage issue, the crisis had only a limited 
impact on the daily lives of most Japanese. For this reason many people 
were inclined to act as if the crisis were someone else' problem illustrated 
by the Japanese proverb-Tire over the river." Public opinion was divided, 
and the proponents of "one nation(unilateral) pacificism" hindered the 
Japanese   government   from   fully   participating   in   international   crisis 
management. 
Given these circumstances, Japan had great difficulty in working 
out a policy package to contribute to international efforts to cope with the 
crisis. The government lacked both a grand strategy and experience in such 
crisis management. The Japanese people were not psychologically ready to 
make sacrifices, because Japan had enjoyed peace for the past forty-five 
years under the U.S. security umbrella. This tendency resulted in the 
disapproval of the bill which included a plan for dispatching SDF overseas 
in 1991. The international community, however, did not allow Japan to 
remain an outsider in the Gulf conflict. In fact, Japan had a great deal at 
stake in the conflict. International law and order are fundamental 
underpinnings of Japan's own peace and security. Furthermore, Japan 
depends heavily on oil imports from the Gulf. 
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Though Japan contributed US$ 13 billion to the side of the Multi- 
National Force, it was criticized by many observers, particularly in the 
United States. The slow Japanese decision making process, the lack of a 
physical presence in the Gulf, and the indecisive attitude regarding Japan's 
role in restoring peace to the region contributed to make those criticisms. 
The   Japanese   tended   to   feel   ambivalent   in   response   to 
international criticism. On the one hand, some felt dissatisfied that although 
Japan was helping to pay the bills, it was not participating in important 
policy decisions made by the United States. On the other hand, intellectuals 
in particular were disappointed by the Japanese government's indecisive 
response to the crisis and were prompted seriously to reconsider Japan's role 
in assuring world peace and stability. This latter group felt annoyed that 
even though Japan made a substantial financial contribution, it made almost 
no visible contribution in terms of personnel. They also were disturbed by 
the governments lack of clear vision and strategy regarding Japan's global 
responsibility. This would be summarized into the following three lessons: 
1. The post-Cold War era will not be free of armed 
conflict. 
2. Japan is unprepared to take a leadership role in 
international political affairs. 
3. A nation cannot attain international stature by 
economic means alone.155 
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Hence heated debates began on what, and how much, Japan 
should do for world peace and security. The debates continue, and the scope 
of discussion has expanded. Japanese now debate not only Japan's peace and 
security role, but Japan's global strategy, or lack thereof, as well.156 The 
characteristics of these debates are much different from those of the Cold 
War era. Japanese security debates during the Cold War were limited within 
the scope of how much Japan would do about the responsibility for 
defending itself in the context of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and how 
much Japan would be involved in the scheme of the U.S. strategic concept 
for regional security. After the Gulf War, Japanese security debates were 
not limited within the domestic and regional spheres, but expanded to how 
much Japan should be involved in world politics for global security and 
peace, and with what kind of means. 
As a result of these debates, Japan is sending some signals which 
include more progressive positions about its role in international peace and 
security. It may not be wrong to say that there is a growing consensus 
among the Japanese today, based upon the experience of the Gulf crisis, that 
Japan should assume larger responsibility and play a more active role in the 
world. We can find several elements which support this vision in political 
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speeches. The former Prime Minister Kaifu gave a speech to the National 
Diet in March 1990: 
The new international order that we seek must be one that 
strives: first, to ensure peace and security; second, to respect 
freedom and democracy; third, to guarantee world prosperity 
through open market economics; fourth, to preserve an 
environment in which all people can lead rewarding lives; and 
fifth, to create stable international relations founded upon 
dialogue and cooperation.157 
One of the key players of the Hosokawa Coalition Government, Ozawa 
Ichiro said in his book "Blueprint for Building a new Japan" that: 
Japan has no choice but to exert every effort to main- 
tain peace, stability, and freedom in international 
society.,...Japan, more than any other nation, must 
work actively in discharging its responsibilities and 
role in attaining that goal. Japan has no other alter- 
native but to become an "international nation" in the 
true sense. 
Also, former Prime Minister Hosokawa expressed his opinion in his New 
Year's Day News Conference that Japan's prosperity is only possible if the 
world's free trade system is maintained.159 
Japanese debates over its global role developed into restructuring 
its political system. Although the direct cause of making opposition to the 
LDP   in   the   July    1993   election   was   several   major   incidents   of 
corruption160, the Gulf War and the LDP's inability to respond were surely 
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one of the other key factors of the result. As a result successive Japanese 
governments have expressed much more progressive policy about its 
international roles. 
In sum, the general trend in Japanese public opinion since the end 
of World War II has been shifting from purely pacificist to a more 
pragmatic nationalist position. Present Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama 
announced that the armed forces are legal, Japan's nuclear reactors, 
providing about a quarter of Japan's electricity, will not be shut down and 
the flag and anthem praising the Emperor will remain the national 
symbols.161 Normally, acknowledging the status quo is not news. But 
considering that the new Prime Minister is the head of the Socialist Party, 
which until now rejected all this as unconstitutional, threats to the people or 
symbols of the militarist past, the statements hinted at the pragmatism 
driving politics as Japan fitfully tears down and reconstructs its party 
system. This announcement tells us that Japanese society has moved to a 
relatively rightist position. 
Therefore, the more rightist Japanese government and its people 
will have less obstacles to implement more active foreign and security 
policies.   Moreover,  revived Japanese national  pride  resulting from  its 
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outstanding achievement in economic development, could make Japanese 
feel that Japan's culture and system is superior to those of Western countries 
as well as any other country. This would contribute to Japanese feeling of 
responsibility for leading international politics in every means. Japan, it 
seems, has reached a loose consensus for Japan's future direction; increasing 
"independence" in its security and foreign policy, and transferring its 
economic power into political power in world politics. 
B. PROSPECTS 
According to Robert Jervis, because of the very existence of nuclear 
weapons, economic factors will be a crucial factor which decides the power 
status in the future world politics. The increasing cost and decreasing benefit 
of war makes it impossible for advanced countries to risk war as an 
alternative to secure their national interests.162 
According to Kenneth N. Waltz, Japan is already a great economic 
power and there has been no country with great economic power that has 
not become a great political power, whether or not reluctantly.163 
Therefore, the key question is not whether the Japanese people wish their 
country to become a great power. The key question is will its people and its 
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leaders begin to feel that Japan needs the range of capabilities possessed by 
other countries in its region, and in the world, to cope defensively and 
preventively with present and possible future problems and threats?164 
As Bill Emmott pointed out, British dominance of world politics in the 
nineteenth century began when it started to export capital around 1815, and 
the United States' arrival as a capital exporter began in earnest in the 1920s 
and lasted until 1941, when it became the world's clear political leader.165 
To many, this suggested that the mid 1980s spelled the beginning of Japan's 
period of economic and, hence, political hegemony.166 If Japan's exports 
of capital were extrapolated into the future, it would be the dominant 
economic power in the world by the turn of the century. The following 
sequence of events, which could lead, logically, to this conclusion, are 
summarized below.167 
1) Capital exports bring influence and establish dependence. 
2) International efforts that require large-scale finance increasingly depend 
on Japanese cooperation. Examples extend from military action in the 
Gulf War and Cambodian peacekeeping operations to aid and loan 
programs for specific countries and multilateral agencies. Debtors' 
economic policies become geared toward Japanese acceptance. 
3) These developments increase and broaden Japanese interests 
internationally. Thus, Japanese groups have more at stake in more hot 
spots around the world and have more concerns about the policies of other 
nations. Pressure will continue to grow on the Japanese government to 
intervene in more areas and   circumstances. 
4) Historically, military power lags behind economic power. Although, 
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Japan wants to remain pacifistic and lightly armed, it will increasingly 
possess the means (both financial and technological) to support a major 
military force. That will increase the temptation to resort to military 
means to address problems. 
In the long-term, if Japan is becoming a political hegemon, then what 
is the future direction of its national strategy. Japan's future direction of 
national strategy would be focused on three dimensions: increasing 
independence in dealing with the United States-Japan Security Treaty, 
enhancing its political status in international politics, and increasing its 
efforts to secure economic interests. 
However, Japan has very few possibilities to alter its security treaty 
with the United States to a fully "independent" security policy. Instead, 
Japan will deepen its security ties with the United States through increasing 
its share of responsibility. Japan would share the burden of the United States 
forces staying in Japan by more than 50 percent. Japan also would increase 
its efforts to improve cooperation with the United States, such as consulting 
on broad security issues at the ministerial level, cooperating closely on the 
operating level, and sharing advanced technologies for military uses. 
Japanese efforts to be an increasingly self-reliant military power will 
probably focus on a naval buildup. A naval buildup would contribute to 
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Japan's  ability  to secure  its  SLOCs out to   1,000  nm,   a goal  already 
expressed by former Prime Ministers Suzuki and Nakasone. 
Japan's concept of comprehensive security will be applied more 
actively for its foreign policy to increase its national status in world politics. 
While Japan will try to institutionalize already established positions in world 
organizations, such as G-7, it will focus its effort on becoming a permanent 
member of the United Nation Security Council. For that purpose, Japan will 
use its ODA for more political objectives and it will participate very actively 
in peacekeeping operations by means of physical presence in addition to its 
financial support. In dealing with regional conflicts in Northeast Asia, Japan 
will try to increase the transparency of military issues, rather than try to 
organize a collective security system. In general, because neighboring states' 
approval is crucial for Japan's political purpose of being a permanent 
member of the UN Security Council, Japan will keenly respond to their 
concerns. 
To ensure its economic security, Japan will try to be involved more 
deeply in economic terms with countries which have strategic importance for 
Japan's economic interests. Japan's efforts will focus on two directions; 
reducing trade barriers and increasing FDI. The priorities of Japan's FDI 
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would be still the United States and Asian nations. Among the Asian 
nations, China and the countries which have abundant natural resources will 
be at the top of the list of Japan's FDI and ODA. But, in dealing with 
Russia, although there are vast economic interests in cooperating with Russia 
to develop the Russian Far East and Siberia, Japan will hesitate its economic 
investment and assistance to those regions until the territorial dispute is 
over. In conclusion, Japan will surely increase its military capability and 
will actively participate in the United Nations' activities, including 
peacekeeping operations. However, to regard Japan's activities as a 
indication of Japan's expansionism might be an overstatement. In the near 
future, Japan has no particular reason to increase its military capability to 
the level of the United States or the former Soviet Union. 
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VI. THE COMMON BASES OF SECURITY 
COOPERATION BETWEEN SOUTH KOREA 
AND JAPAN 
A. SOUTH KOREA'S NATIONAL INTERESTS 
1. Unification 
Koreans remember quite vividly the frustration and bitter experience 
endured by their ancestors at the dawn of this century. Korea lost its 
sovereignty to Japan in 1910 and was liberated from it in 1945 not by 
herself but by other foreign powers; the United States and the USSR. As a 
result, the Korea nation, was divided into two countries, which have 
extremly different political systems, and a terrible experience of civil war 
under strong influence of foreign powers. As a result, both Koreas had spent 
large amounts of their resources for their defense which has restrained their 
ability to engage in more productive activities. 
Owing to its geographical location, the Korean peninsula has been the 
place of conflicts betwen continental power and maritime power in East 
Asia. As a people having a bitter history, Koreans bear in mind that they 
must maintain an independent, unified state, strong enough to keep its 
sovereignty for themselves, and they believe that it will also contribute to 
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the peace of the region. They realized a very common lesson of power 
politics; if you do not want war, prepare for war, and national power is 
fundamentally dependent on economic capability. Nowadays, while South 
Koreans think that they won the competititon with the North because of 
South Korea's successful economy, they also realize that unification of 
Korea is essential for further economic development. Another factor which 
forces Koreans to regard unification as the ultimate goal is the people 
themselves. Before the division of the peninsula, Koreans shared the 
common experience of a peaceful community of one nation for several 
thousand years. At present, a quarter of South Koreans are immigrants from 
North Korea or their decendants. These factors reinforce their desire for 
unification. 
2. Military Security 
Apart from the experience of the Korean war, there are several factors 
which make South Koreans' desire to defend their country from North 
Korea's military threat the first priority of their policy. North Korea's strong 
military capability (more than 1 million) and their offensive strategy (65 
percent of North Korean military are deployed around the Demilitarized 
148 
Zone[DMZ] are the primary indication of the North Korean threat.168 
South Korea's structural vulnerability created by an over-concentration of 
its economy around Seoul area (75 percent) and of the short distance 
between Seoul and the DMZ (26 miles) strengthens the North Korean 
threat. To meet this threat, South Korean governments have spent more than 
6 percent of the ROK's GNP on defense expenditure until the mid-1980s. 
The "dilemma of rising demands and insufficient resources," makes 
it very difficult for South Korean government to spent large amounts of its 
budget on defense expenditures in the future. In South Korea, money for 
defense has always been a number one priority, but now the defense budget 
has become a pawn among politicians.169 Therefore, as a very vulnerable 
country due to North Korea's threat, it is natural that South Korea's first 
concern must be the protection of its security on the Korean Peninsula as 
well as reducing its defense spending. 
3. Economic Security 
The dynamics of South Korea's economic growth over the last three 
decades can be understood as the successful implementation of an export- 
oriented  industrialization strategy.  Because South Korea does not have 
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enough natural resources upon which to base its export growth, the only 
way is to export manufactured goods in order to attain rapid economic 
growth. Consequently, South Korea's economy is doubly vulnerable. First 
of all, South Korea depends on exports for its economic growth. Secondly, 
it depends highly on foreign resources in order to make goods both for 
export and domestic demands. Thirdly, it depends on relatively few 
countries for both its export markets and resource suppliers. 
In dealing with these problems, South Korea's achievements have been 
outstanding. It reduced its dependency on the Middle East for oil from 100 
percent in 1978 to 56 percent in 1988. Its dependence on oil as a primary 
source of energy dropped from over 70 percent in 1979 to below 50 percent 
in 1991.17° 
However, it can not unilaterally solve the fundamental problem—to 
secure stable supply sources and safe supply routes. Because of the 
structural vulnerability of South Korea's economy, the secure condition of 
its long sea lanes is virtually a matter of survival. 
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B. THE NEED OF COOPERATION WITH JAPAN 
1. Economic security 
One of the key factors why South Korea pushed the normalization talks 
with Japan was its need for Japanese economic aid. As the talks concluded, 
Japan began to provide South Korea with a total of $800 million. This 
assistance became one of the contributors to South Korea's rapid economic 
development. Moreover, South Korea modeled itself on the Japanese 
economic development strategy and infrastructure. Japan has been one of the 
most important trading partner (29% of total imports in 1990, 21 % of total 
exports in the same year) of South Korea, along with the United States. 
South Korea in 1992 exported US$ 11.6 billion to, and imported US$ 19.5 
billion from, Japan. South Korea also has been within the top five trading 
partners of Japan (about 6.0% of its total trade in 1992). Japan's share of 
South Korea's technology imports had been over 50 percent of its total 
imports until 1990. An estimated 75 percent of South Korea's high-tech 
manufacturing equipment comes from Japan. While Japan only accounted for 
17.2 percent of foreign investment in South Korea 1992, Japan brought 43.5 
percent of the technology transfers. 
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Another point of economic relations between the two countries is that 
they compete with each other to get world markets. As South Korean firms 
lost competitiveness in many areas resulting from increased labor costs, 
South Korea's economy seeks to focus more on hi-tech industry. Therefore 
it needs Japan's assistance more, but Japan is hesitant to provide more high 
technology. The more Japan gives to South Korea, the stronger the 
competition it encounters from Korea. 
Agriculture Textile Chemistry Iron Machines Electronics 
1.4 1.7 -2.3 -0.4 -5.95 -2.9 
Table 4. South Korea's Trade balance in Major goods with Japan in 
1991( $billion). 
Source: Korea Bank, "present trade balance with Japan," 1992. 
Therefore, though there is deep interdependence between Japan and 
South Korea's economy, South Korea needs Japanese goods and technology 
more than Japan needs South Korean goods. 
Also, South Korea and Japan's economies are in the same position in 
their dependence on foreign suppliers of raw materials, and in high 
dependence on foreign trade. South Korea's import dependency for its oil 
is 100 percent, mainly on the Middle East countries, and over 90 percent of 
its coal  and  iron  ore,  mainly  from Australia and Canada.  Except for 
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tungsten. South Korea depends highly on imports for its resources needed 
to make goods.171 
While securing its SLOCs is a matter of survival to South Korea, it 
has almost no means to secure its extended sea lanes by its own military 
capability. Although South Korea has the opportunity to reach the resources 
that are abundant in the Russian Far East and the abundant labor markets in 
China's northeast provinces, its dependence on the sealanes for resource 
imports and goods exports can not be discounted. Therefore, the only choice 
that is left is military dependence on a country which has the power 
capability to secure the SLOCs. During the Cold War era, the United States 
had that capability, but as U.S. will and capability to do so declined 
resulting from the end of the confrontation with the Soviet Union, South 
Korea can not depend as fully on the U.S. guarantee for its SLOCs. Japan 
is in the exactly same position as South Korea. Therefore, whether it would 
be with the United States, or with Japan and China combined, South Korea 
has no choice but to cooperate with those countries which will perform that 
role. And then, which may be the most possible substitute for the United 
States to do that role in East Asia? When we consider their capabilities at 
present and their potentials, China and Japan will be the answers. However, 
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when we consider which country has at the greatest stake in securimg its 
SLOCs, Japan is the one with an absolute need to do so. Also, it has been 
emphasized in the past that there was a big advantage for South Korea in 
cooperating with Japan concerning the Eastern Sea (Japan Sea) during the 
Cold War era.172 As shown in the Tumen River Development Program, 
the Eastern Sea becomes more important today not only for military 
security, but for economic and environmental purposes. 
2. Politico- Military Security 
Politically, although there have been ups and downs, generally the two 
countries have cooperated well within the framework of the United States' 
strategy. South Korea's efforts to deter North Korea and Japan's efforts to 
defend against the former Soviet Union's threat have been well harmonized 
by U.S. leadership. We can see the obvious evidence in North Korea's 
nuclear issue. Japan tried to normalize relationships with North Korea just 
after the diplomatic normalization between South Korea and the former 
Soviet Union.173 But Japan suspended this negotiation when North Korea 
threatened to withdraw from the NPT. Furthermore, former Prime Minister 
Hosokawa was sending signals that South Korean President Kim's reform 
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was the model for his political reform. South Korea's need of cooperation 
has broadened from just economic cooperation to political cooperation. 
Although South Korea enjoyed great success in its foreign policy by 
normalizing relations with the Soviet Union and China under the name of 
"Northern Politics", it still has lots of obstacles to achieve its ultimate goal- 
reunification. Unfortunately, the issue of Korean unification is beyond the 
Koreans themselves. Without close cooperation with all the major powers 
which have their stakes in the Korean peninsula-the United States, China, 
Japan, and Russia - Korean unification would be almost impossible. The 
relevant countries to the Korean peninsula are all trying to expand their 
sphere of influence on the Korean peninsula. Even the United States which 
has been regarded as a "bloody shared" ally by South Koreans, is moving 
toward recognizing North Korea and is making negotiations for diplomatic 
normalization between the United States and North Korea. The Geneva 
Agreement between the United States and North Korea on October 21, 
1994. is generally regarded as a symptom of the United States shifting 
policy on the Korean peninsula.174 Therefore, Japan should be recognized 
as one of the key players by South Koreans in order to achieve unification 
with the North under South Korean leadership. 
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The South Korean government might prefer gradual unification with 
North Korea to sudden unification resulting from a possible collapse by the 
North. South and North Korea should remain politically independent until 
their per capita income levels are roughly equal to minimize the cost of 
unification. At present, it is estimated that South Korea's GNP is fourteen 
times bigger than that of North Korea, and the South's per capita GNP is 
seven times bigger than that of the North.175 It is best to boost North 
Korea's economy so that it, too, copes with the cost of uniting with the 
South. Many institutions estimated the total cost of Korean unification at 
between 200 billion U.S. dollars and 800 billion dollars.176 During the 
Cold War era, South Korea was opposed to Japan's support for North 
Korea. The South Korean Government seemed to accept that Japan's support 
for North Korea would be helpful for reunification in the long run, while it 
worried about Japan's two Korea policy. Moreover, if sudden unification 
materialized through the collapse of the North Korean regime, South 
Korea's need for capital to revive North Korea's economy will become more 
urgent. In that case again, Japan is one of the plausible sources for financial 
help. 
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In security terms, there has been little evidence of direct cooperation 
between South Korea and Japan. But in actuality, under the framework of 
the United States' military guidelines, South Korea and Japan have 
cooperated very well. In 1969, Japan expressed the view "South Korea's 
security is essential to that of Japan." During the early 1980s, the South 
Korean government requested Japanese economic aid under the logic that 
Japan had to provide a large loan to help maintain South Korea as a 
'bulwark' against communism.177 Prime Minister Nakasone accepted this 
logic and extended $4 billion in aid and loans to South Korea after long 
debates. Since the middle 1980s, Japan (1981) and South Korea (1988) have 
participated in the Rim-Pac Exercise. Most of the United States forces which 
have participated in the Team Spirit moved from bases in Japan, and in 
logistical terms, this situation became more important. 
In dealing with North Korean threats, it is virtually a South Korean 
problem. However, Japan also has some problems from the North Korean 
threat inducing a possible refugee problem that could result from conflict on 
the Korean Peninsula and from pro-North Korean residents in Japan. 
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VII. THE ROLE OF KOREA 
A. KOREAN'S VIEW OF JAPAN 
1. South Korea 
Two controversial factors coexist in the relationship between South 
Korea and Japan: the need for cooperation in real terms, such as economic, 
political, and even military; and distrust between the two peoples resulting 
from historical legacies. While the former has evolved very rapidly since 
diplomatic normalization concluded in 1965, the latter has improved very 
slowly and has the potential to make cooperation very difficult between the 
two countries. 
Starting from Prime Minister Nakasone's visit to South Korea in 
1983, there have been several apologies by the prime ministers and 
Emperors of Japan. In 1984, when he received President Chun, Emperor 
Hirohito said that "It is indeed regrettable that there was an unfortunate past 
between us for period in this century, and I believe that it should not be 
repeated." In 1990, Emperor Akihito (son of Hirohito) said, "I think of the 
sufferings your people underwent during this unfortunate period, which was 
brought about by my country, and cannot help but feel the deepest regret." 
Japan's former Prime Minister Hosokawa had summits with South Korea's 
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President Kim on November 6, 1993 in Kyungju. Prime Minister Hosokawa 
again expressed apologies for Japanese wrongdoing during the colonial era 
and promised to cooperate with the South Korean government closely in 
dealing with North Korea's nuclear issue. Unlike other Japanese prime 
ministers, Hosokawa was not reluctant in naming the atrocities such as 
banning the Koreans from using their own language, forcing them to change 
their names into Japanese, mobilizing Korean women as "sex slaves" for 
Japanese troops and forcing young men into labor camps. It appeared that 
Prime Minister Hosokawa's apology for the atrocities which Japan 
committed during its colonial rule satisfied most Koreans.178 
In response to this progress, South Korean President Kim Young Sam 
emphasized at the press conference after the summit, "We, South Koreans 
must not forget the past, but we must not cling to it any longer." President 
Kim said about the issue of comfort women long before the birth of the new 
Hosokawa Government and expressions of apology in Japan, "We will only 
demand a clear investigation into the truth of the matter; we will not demand 
material compensation."179 He has expressed the view that the issues of 
history textbooks and comfort women are not South Korea's problem but are 
only Japan's domestic problem, thus we do not need to bother about those 
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issues. Also, President Kim ordered the demolition of two symbolic 
buildings which were built during Japanese colonial rule and had been used 
as important South Korean government offices, the old Blue House and the 
National Museum saying that "They are physical symbols of Japanese 
colonial repression, and people merely look at these buildings and feel 
resentment."180 
As a result of these efforts, it seems that most of problems over the 
historical legacies are resolved, at least at the government level, and South 
Korea has started to see Japan in real pragmatic terms escaping from the 
past ghosts. As a political procedure, only one step may be left; the 
Emperor's visit to South Korea or a unified Korea. But in the most 
fundamental people's feeling, it seems that it will take more time to rule out 
the historical bad memories from the two peoples' hearts. Recently, Shin 
Yong Ha, a professor at Seoul National University, said that, "We should 
urgently work out strategies to keep us from becoming subordinate to Japan, 
and furthermore to realize national reunification so that we can overtake 
Japan in the next century," in his book titled New Japanese Hegemony and 
Korea-Japan Relations.'81 The spirit of "catch up to Japan" has been a 
major catalyst to make Koreans work so hard in economic development. 
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This feeling will last longer among Koreans than expected. 
As the political issues have been resolved significantly, the economic 
issues between the two countries become key factors of conflict between 
them. Deep economic interdependency between South Korea and Japan, but 
in favor of Japan, is replacing the past historical legacies. South Korea's 
economic dependence on Japan has evoked strong resentment among 
Koreans reminding them a different form of "the Great East Asia Co- 
prosperity Sphere" which was used by Japanese before the end of World 
War II. 
In national security, they have common interests in maintaining stability 
in the region. They are, however, well aware of each other. Recently South 
Korea broadened its definition of threat in a more comprehensive terms that 
sounds like Japan's.182 Japan also shifted its defense strategy with Korean 
tensions in mind. 
This progress from the historical legacy to more pragmatic positions 
was possible because of the strengthened self-confidence of South Koreans 
resulting from their progress in economic and political terms, and their 
progressive perception of international politics. Since former President Roh 
Tae Woo launched his "Northern Policy", South Korean government foreign 
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policy has become more active. Present Foreign Minister of South Korea, 
Han Sung-joo, has expressed his policy base as follows: globalism, 
diversification, multi-dimensionalism, regional cooperation, and future 
orientation.183 Based on this policy, South Korea seems to have set up 
three diplomatic goals: (1) improving its relations with neighboring 
countries, China and Japan, while maintaining and improving its ties with 
the United States and other traditional allies; (2) resolving North Korea's 
nuclear problem and to opening North Korea to the international community 
through close cooperation with the four major powers which are related to 
the Korean peninsula; and (3) developing APEC into a more comprehensive 
organization including security cooperation, such as a mim-CSCE. 
South Korea is sending some significant signals to visualize its foreign 
policy toward Japan. South Korea has not expressed its opposition to Japan's 
efforts to contact North Korea for diplomatic normalization. Japan expressed 
its willingness to resume the talks with North Korea for diplomatic 
normalization, without tying the North Korean nuclear issue to preconditions 
on the resumption of the Pyongyang-Tokyo talks, when the delegation of the 
Japanese Social Democratic Party headed to North Korea in December 28, 
1993,  and formally proposed it in January 9,   1994.  Japan's logic for 
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contacting North Korea is that isolation of North Korea would be harmful 
to maintain stability in the region, which, in turn, has been regarded as a 
by-product of Japan's two Korea policy which has encouraged division 
rather than reunification by Koreans. 
South Korea's initial position in response to Japan's "sudden 
rapprochement" to North Korea in 1990 was that it would have not only a 
negative impact upon the inter-Korea talks, but also would make it more 
difficult for the realization of peaceful reunification of Korea. As the high 
cost of the reunification was revealed, and South Korea realized that sudden 
reunification would be a large burden for South Korea's economy, this 
policy has changed progressively. Foreign aid to North Korea would 
encourage it to open its society and could contribute to reducing the 
reunification bill. South Korea seemed to accept that Japan's support of 
North Korea is helpful for reunification, while it worries about Japan's two 
Korea policy. Moreover, if sudden unification materialized by the collapse 
of the North Korean regime, South Korea will need capital to revive North 
Korea's economy. In that case again, Japan is one of the powerful 
alternatives. 
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Moreover, South Korean ambassador to Japan, Gong Ro-myung 
expressed the view that South Korea should back Japan on the United 
Nations Security Council permanent membership issue.185 Also, South 
Koreans are debating whether to lift the ban on Japanese popular culture 
imports from Japan.186 Also, the rate of students going to Japan for study 
is sharply increasing while that of students going to the United States is 
slowing down.187 
In sum, political issues based on historical legacies have been at the 
core of the conflicts between Japan and South Korea. While the importance 
of political issues still exists, economic factors are becoming the core of the 
conflict between the two countries. Thus, Japan's economic leverage over 
South and North Korea will help determine the relations between them. If 
Japan supports North Korea for the purpose of opening its society under 
close consultation with South Korea, Japanese efforts will greatly contribute 
to rule out distrust between the two countries. But if Japan uses its economic 
leverage in order to strengthen North Korea's capability to compete with 
South Korea, and to maintain the present division, and to increase its 
influence through economic monopoly in North Korea, it will add another 
log to a demolishing fire. 
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However, in the future, the relations between South Korea or a unified 
Korea, and Japan will not be determined by themselves like the United 
States' strategy has influenced the relations between South Korea and Japan 
during the Cold War. In the face of a lessening United States military 
presence and influence in the region, other factor, such as Chinese and 
Russian strategies, will be the main external contributor to the relations 
between South Korea (or a unified Korea) and Japan. 
2. North Korea 
The political changes in Eastern Europe and the Tienanmen Square 
incident in China forced North Korean leaders to be concerned about 
domestic upheaval and maintaining its system as a communist country rather 
than competing with South Korea for the control of the whole Korean 
peninsula. North Korean President Kim II Sung visited Beijing in November 
1989. During his visit top-level leaders of North Korea and China 
exchanged views concerning party leadership and pursuing the way of 
socialism.188 
The Soviet Union's recognition of South Korea in September 1990, 
placed North Korea in an even more difficult situation. Their perception was 
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that South Korea will use the Soviet's position as an excuse to reunify Korea 
by absorbing North Korea as in Germany.189 
On the other hand, North Korea's spending of $4.7 billion for the 
13th World Festival of Youth and Students held in Pyongyang in July 1989 
to undermine the Seoul Olympics, made its economy almost 
unrecoverable.190 Further, a shift in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
European countries from planned economies to market economies struck an 
additional blow to an already troubled North Korea. The Soviets stopped 
their barter trade with North Korea and requested hard currency and, 
moreover, they started to sell Soviets oil to North Korea at international 
prices. This meant that a sharp decrease of the trade between North Korea 
and the Soviets which had amounted to about 60 percent of North Korean 
foreign trade at that time. 
Thus, it appears that the most reasonable choice for North Korea was 
to suggest establishing diplomatic relations with Japan at the time when the 
Soviet Union was setting up diplomatic relations with South Korea. North 
Korea proposed the speedy stablishment of relations with Japan to the 
Kanemaru-Tanabe delegation, which visited Pyongyang in September 1990, 
just prior to the establishment of relations between South Korea and the 
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Soviet Union. As the Secretary General of the Korean Worker's Party, Kim 
Yong Sun, frankly indicated to them, North Korea had decided to open 
diplomatic channels with Japan in order to adjust to the drastically changed 
international situation and to resolve severe economic difficulties. They also 
were confident that substantial reparations would accompany the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with Japan, and thus North Korea 
could receive several benefits.191 This meant that North Korea was 
defeated in the diplomatic and economic realms in its 40-year-long 
competititon with the South over the correct system of government in the 
same way that the Soviet Union was defeated in the long war of attrition 
between two competing systems known as the Cold War. There was no 
other reason for the proud North Korean leaders to propose the 
establishment of diplomatic relations to the Japanese delegation.192 
Based on this logic, North Korea suggested early diplomatic 
normalization with Japan when the delegates from the LDP and JSP visited 
in Pyongyang in September 1990. Although they held eight official meetings 
for diplomatic normalization between Japan and North Korea since their first 
official meeting in Beijing in November 1990, Japan and North Korea have 
failed to reach that goal. The major reason is the nuclear issue of North 
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Korea. Because the nuclear issue could not be solved by the two sides, 
Japan and North Korean negotiations for diplomatic normalization suddenly 
broadened into the issues of South Korea and most importantly of the United 
States with the North Korean nuclear issue. 
North Korea seemed to realize that the main reason for its failure to 
achieve diplomatic normalization with Japan is not in the relations between 
North Korea and Japan, but in the relations between North Korea and the 
United States. And then, why did Japan suddenly change its Korea policy 
in 1989? Japan's new approach on the Korean Peninsula, seeking to 
establish diplomatic relations with North Korea while keeping good relations 
with South Korea, can be regarded as a reaction to policy shifts of the other 
three great powers toward the Korean Peninsula and the success of Seoul's 
Nordpolitik. It also reflects Japan's intention to occupy North Korea's 
market and to have a greater voice on the Korea problem.193 
During North Korea's talks with Japan, its intention was mainly 
caused by its desire for Japan's economic assistance. North Korea did 
request reparations from Japan not only for its colonial rule, but also for the 
•sufferings' after World War II. As China's intention to recognize South 
Korea became obvious, North Korea's foreign policy was implemented by 
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its political purposes. North Korea was still opposed to cross recognition by 
the four major countries, which South Korea has insisted upon under its 
"Northern Policy". 
But, as the international situation changed in favor of South Korea, 
and as South Korea expressed its intention to join the United Nations 
without considering North Korea's position, and China confirmed that it 
would not oppose South Korea's admission as an UN member, North Korea 
had no choice but to follow South Korea's policy. As a result South and 
North Korea were admitted as members of the United Nations in May 
1991.,94 
As China opened its ties with South Korea in August 1992, North 
Korea was isolated totally. From this time North Korea's policy has focused 
on achieving cross recognition from the United States and Japan. For the 
purpose of getting recognition and economic assistance, North Korea has 
been playing with its nuclear program. This means that North Korea worries 
that it would be absorbed by South Korea. 
North Korea's position can be well explained by its unification policy 
at present. According to Lee Sam Ro, the head of North Korean delegation 
for North Korea-Japanese normalization talks. North Korea is trying to get 
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time to recover its national energy to compete with South Korea through 
making diplomatic normalization with the United States and Japan and 
getting economic assistance as a byproduct of those negotiations, which 
may be real purpose of North Korea. Mr Lee stated:195 
The reunification of the Korean peninsula meets the strategic 
interests of the United States and Japan, both of which are 
deeply involved in Korean affairs  The United States 
and Japan must therefore not obstruct Korea's reunification but 
must develop their Korea policy so as to encourage its 
realization....It is essential in particular that the United States 
and Japan have the courage to correct their one-sided policy 
toward the Korean peninsula and pursue a fair and reasonable 
approach toward the North and the South that will be benefit 
efforts toward reunification as well as toward progress in 
improving the inter-Korean relationship. It is cold war thinking 
to blindly support one side only and remain unreasonably 
hostile to the other....For the sake of the reunification, the 
United states and Japan should, as a matter of course, adopt an 
equally balanced policy toward the two parts of the divided 
Korean Peninsula,  and create a good atmosphere so as to 
encourage the two sides to understand and cooperate with each 
other on the way toward reunification. 
Some people say that improved inter-Korean relations are the 
prerequisite for better DPRK-U.S. and DPRK-Japan relations, 
but we believe this is not the right logic. The "North-South 
dialogue first" approach, intended to improve DPRK-U.S, and 
DPRK-Japan relations, is really meant to increase the one-sided 
pressure of the United States, Japan and South Korea on the 
North. In effect, however, such pressure will result only in 
laying obstacles in the way of progress toward North-South 
dialogue and reunification. No outside pressure-political, 
military, or economic-will ever bring down our socialist system. 
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Thus, at present, North Korea's concern is to survive on its own 
terms and not to be absorbed by South Korea like Eastern Germany was by 
West Germany. And it is trying to develop its economy to open partially to 
foreign countries just like China has been doing since the early 1980s. 
Based on this logic, North Korea's view of Japan is similar to South 
Korea's perception of the former Soviet Union, now Russia, and China. 
While South Korea's concern for Russia and China is mainly motivated by 
its political objectives, North Korea's present view of Japan is shaped by its 
need for Japanese economic assistance. 
In sum, the relationship between Japan and North Korea has many 
obstacles to be overcome by the two sides. However, it will not take as long 
to resolve the historical issues between North Korea and Japan because 
South Korea has already spent much time doing so, and, as a result, Japan 
has gained experience coping with these problems. Moreover, North Korea's 
absolute need for Japanese economic assistance will force Pyongyang to 
approach diplomatic negotiations with Japan in a more pragmatic manner 
than Seoul-Tokyo negotiations during the Cold War era. But in general. 
North Korea's view of Japan will largely depend on the future development 
of unification issues. 
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B. IMPACT OF KOREAN UNIFICATION ON JAPAN'S 
SECURITY 
It is assumed that future relations between Japan and a unified Korea 
will be competitive in all aspects.196 For example, a unified Korea, despite 
confonting economic problems in the initial stage of unification, will prove 
in the long run to be a far more potent economy than the sum of its two 
parts. The economic competitiveness between the two countries will 
eventually come about when the difference in their respective economic 
strength narrows. In addition, as Japan's role increases in the region, a 
unified Korea will have to serve as a counter weight to excessive Japanese 
predominance in Northeast Asia whether of its own volition or that of 
others. This point is likely to spur friction and competition between the two 
nations. 
The Yomiuri Shimbun reported in December 1993, that "With the fall 
of the Soviet Union, Japan's Self-Defense Forces shifted defense strategy 
from centering around Hokkaido and renamed the annual maneuvers of the 
GSDF. The northern mobile exercises have been based on the assumption 
of an enemy landing on Hokkaido since 1982, but after the fall of the Soviet 
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Union it was renamed the "long-distance special mobile exercise." The 
maneuver traditionally saw the movements of 5,000 troops, tanks, and 
weapons from Gumma, Aichi, and Kumamoto prefectures to Hokkaido. 
From 1996 on, however, the exercise will concentrate on moving troops and 
weapons to western Honshu and Kyushu as a consequence of Japan's 
perception that tension has shifted away from northern Japan, to the Korean 
Peninsula."19^ 
South Korea's Defense Ministry expanded its defense objective from 
"to defend the nation from armed aggression by North Korea" to "by 
potential adversaries."198 This means that Seoul has expanded its definition 
of an enemy from just North Korea to a more comprehensive term (which 
actually includes Japan and China) 
A well-known Japanese author and TV personality, Tanemura 
Kenichi, reportedly said, " An all-out invasion of Japan by Korea is 
inevitable if Korea is unified... therefore it is in Japan's best interest to help 
North Korea economically so the Korean Peninsula remains divided as 
11 lL)9 now. 
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Is unification of Korea a real threat to Japan's security and to peace 
in Northeast Asia? The answer depends on what kind of country a unified 
Korea will be. The future of a unified Korea will be a crucial factor which 
decides not only the future of Japan's security policy, but also the future of 
international politics in Northeast Asia. 
1. Security Threat 
Some Japanese prefer the present state of tension in Korea to the 
instability they imagine might come with unification. They worry that a 
united Korea might turn its considerable military energy against its historical 
enemy Japan. Although talk of invasion is preposterous in light of Japan's 
naval advantage, the combination of North Korea's 1.1 million strong 
active forces and South Korea's 660,000 armed force would dwarf the 
number of Japan's modest 250,000-person SDF. Most frightening of all is 
the prospect that a united Korea might possess nuclear weapons. It has been 
repeatedly said that North Korea could be able to manufacture a small 
number of nuclear weapons by the year 1995. If Koreans come to possess 
nuclear weapons, the Japanese may have to reconsider their own inhibitions 
toward nuclear armament. 
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Threat assessments are based on perceived intentions as well as 
capabilities. Some Japanese fear that a united Korea would be motivated to 
turn its military attention toward them. In Korea hatred toward Japan is 
today overshadowed by the North-South confrontation. Following 
reunification, this internal focus may shift to an external subject. The 
resentment no longer would be dissipated by division. 
There is one factor to support these assessments —nationalism. One 
of the main motivators of South Korea's rapid economic development is 
surely the South Koreans' desire to catch up with Japan. Similiarily, North 
Korea has managed its country under the Juche ideology, which empahsizes 
the concept of independence to the extreme of autarky. For the purpose of 
strengthening Juche, Pyongyang has cultivated its people's strong animosity 
to foreigners, especially to the Japanese and Americans. If Korea's 
unification is facilitated by concentrating national energy in the name of 
nationalism, it could be easily translated into anti-Japanese sentiment. This 
feeling could be converted into military escalation to a level which might be 
perceived as a threat by its neighbors. This, in turn, would create a security 
dilemma. 
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The argument that a unified Korea will be a great threat to its 
neighbors, however, is based on the assumption that Korea will maintain a 
sizable military force comparable to the combined forces of North and South 
Korea. A unified Korea, given its geography and historical experience, will 
always need to maintain a sizable defense force. But the need to maintain 
large military forces is in doubt. Given the traditional benchmark for armed 
forces strength of one percent of population, a united Korea could be 
expected to keep about 650,000 troops for its defense.200 Moreover, 
considering the great cost of rebuilding North Korea, maintaining a large 
military will not be the top priority of a unified Korea. 
Furthermore, maintaining a large military force might complicate 
reunification. Because of the high strategic value of the Korean peninsula, 
the nations of Northeast Asia do not want a unified Korea to be dominated 
by any one of its neighbors, nor do they want a unified Korea with 
enormous military strength.201 In any case, Korea's neighbors would not 
easily accept reunification that kept over 1.7 million men under arms. 
Korean unity will take place within the framwork of the international 
community. Seoul and Pyongyang both envision the major powers providing 
some sort of security guarantees to a united Korea. In exchange, the major 
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powers will undoubtedly want to see Korea make guarantees similar to those 
pledged by united Germany.202 These would include a renunciation of 
mass-destructive weapons and a limit on total armed forces. This is also 
compatible to Korea's national interests. 
Moreover, both North and South Korea have developed a military 
structure that focuses on an army and air force rather than, on a navy. It is 
generally accepted that a naval buildup requires more money and time than 
to build either an army or an air force. Thus, it would take a long time for 
a united Korea to develop a naval capability to threaten Japan. 
The next point is the question of Korea's intention to threaten Japan. 
Historically Korea has rarely invaded Japan. During the 13th century, Korea 
was involved in the Mongol invasions of Japan. Except for that, even when 
Korea's national power was regarded as far ahead that of Japan, Korea has 
never tried to invade Japan. Moreover, because of the vulnerablity of 
Korea's economic structure, Seoul could expect no benefit from war. Korea 
needs peace and stability not only to facilitate reunification, but also to 
maintain its international position among great powers. 
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2. Economic Threat 
A united Korea, with its diligent work force, a highly educated 
population, of 65 million, and a greatly reduced defense budget, would be 
a strong economic power, especially in sectors where South Korea already 
has a geographic and product advantage. South Korean Chaebol are strong 
in the areas where Russia and China seek investment: construction and 
heavy engeneering, as well as cars and consumer goods. Korea's lower-cost 
goods are said to be more suitbale for the relatively primitive post- 
communist economies than are Japan's high-tech, precision products. The 
industries and firms of a unified Korea may be freer from the political 
considerations in trading issues. This will be of greater advantage to Korean 
companies in investing in the Russian Far East than to Japanese companies. 
In sum, the fundamental premise of this argument is that Korea and 
Japan's economies have very similar structures. As a result, Korea and 
Japan will compete with each other to secure raw materials and export 
markets. However, in terms of natural resources, they are in a position of 
cooperation rather than of competition. Because it is generally believed that 
natural resources are abundant to share with each other, and their SLOCs 
for  resources  imports  are far  beyond  their  own jurisdiction,   the two 
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countries need to cooperate rather than compete with each other. 
In dealing with export markets, Korea and Japan are in the same 
position. As world economies form regional blocs, the room becomes very 
narrow and further trade will be dealt with on a bilateral basis vis-a-vis 
countries. Because Japan and Korea are in very similar positions to cope 
with trade issues and in dealing with regional or global economic blocs such 
as the EC, NAFTA, APEC, and GATT, the need for cooperation becomes 
more critical than the pressures for competititon between Japan and Korea. 
Moreover, after unification, Koreans will be preoccupied internally. 
All available capital will be channeled into reconstructing the thread-bare 
North. The daunting task of infrastructure investment and industrial 
retooling will take years.203 The present needs of South Korea for Japan's 
high technology and North Korea's needs for Japan's capital and technology 
will not change dramatically after unification. This will increase economic 
interdependence between a unified Korea and Japan. Economic 
interdependence does not mean cooperation in and of itself, but it will 
contribute to making a united Korea and Japan more cautious to criticizing 
each other. 
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The concern that a unified Korean economy will be an excessively 
strong competitor for Japan's economy is illogical. Economies are not 
engaged in a zero-sum game. Co-prosperity will make the two countries see 
each other with a fairness. As South Korea's economic success will 
contribute to resolving historical problems, a prosperous economy of a 
unified Korea will help Koreans to see Japan in a more progressive light. 
This relationship will be applied to the Japanese, too. 
3. Fear of Refugees 
Many Japanese worry that Korean reunification, even through peaceful 
means, would flood Kyushu with refugees. In this nightmare, the image of 
a geopolitical dagger is transfigured as a human wave. An influx of Koreans 
is doubly feared, because they are most able to blend among the Japanese 
people due to their similiar shape and cultural bases. The Japanese think that 
the Koreans already living in Japan are trouble enough. 
Fears of a "human wave" of Korean refugees have been greatly 
exaggerated. Foreign affairs critic Hideki Kase writes, "while the exact 
number of Korean refugees who successfuly fled to Japan before and during 
the Korean War is unknown due to their ability to blend in with the resident 
181 
Korean community, the figures may be as high as 200,000-500,000. "204 
This estimate is widely repeated in Japan, without much analysis. Numbers 
this high would mean that one quarter to one-half of the ethnic Korean 
community in Japan came voluntarily at a time when well over a million 
Koreans were moving the other way. The actual figures on illegal 
immigration, according to the Ministry of Justice in Japan, were 45,960 
Koreans arrested trying to enter Japan from April 1946 to 1951.2(b 
Moreover, comparatively few came during the Korean War itself, even 
when it appeared that Communists might take over the whole peninsula 
(2,434 arrested in 1950 and 3,503 in 1951). If unification is realized as 
a result of the collapse of North Korea, because of their language and 
education, it will be easier for North Korean refugees to get jobs in South 
Korea rather than in Japan. Already in South Korea, more than 200,000 
illegal immigrants are working, which means that South Korea has some 
capability to absorb North Korean workers. 
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VIII. CNCLUSION 
The end of the Cold War and the relative decline of the United States' 
commitments for regional defense in the Western Pacific, makes the region's 
security very complex. Japan's emergence as an economic superpower with 
the existing historical legacies of Japanese military expansionism, intensified 
the complexity of the region's security environment. It has increased 
people's concern about Japan's future intentions, especially in terms of its 
security policy for the region's peace and stability. 
It seems that Japan is already acting as one of the political 
superpowers in world politics with its vast economic resources. Japanese 
society is moving toward becoming a "normal nation," which means that 
it becomes easier for Japan to develop its military capability. Japan has the 
capability to build up its military in a large scale. Thus, the future direction 
of Japan's security policy depends on Japanese intentions rather than Japan's 
capabilities. 
The Japanese has been very reluctant to increase their military 
capability even under the security threats from the communists bloc- 
mainly the Soviet Union- during the Cold War era. While the Japanese 
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attitude has moved toward right position, their perception of threat has 
decreased significantly resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Therefore, Japan's security policy will be mainly influenced by its foreign 
relations rather than by its own initiative. There is little possibility for Japan 
to collide with the United States and China. While the prospects for Japan's 
security relations with Russia are not so bright, the possibility of collision 
is not high, either. Thus, the future direction of Korean unification will 
significantly influence the region's security environment, especially Japan's 
security policy. 
The situation on the Korean peninsula looks very serious today 
because of North Korea's nuclear issue. But in the long run, it seems that 
South Korea is in a good position to achieve its ultimate goal of 
reunification. However, there are many obstacles for South and North Korea 
to achieve that goal. Unfortunately, since the division of the Korean 
peninsula was not decided by their own will, but by foreign powers, it will 
be very difficult to unify the two Koreas into one Korea without getting all 
four major powers' cooperation. All the four powers are playing off one 
another and the two Koreas for their own national interests. Thus, if the 
conflicts among the four powers intensify around the Korean peninsula, 
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Korea will have to face another risk of being a scapegoat for other big 
power countries' power politics. Therefore, South Korea's need for 
cooperation with the four powers-- the United States, Japan, China, and 
Russia, becomes very high. Among them, China and Japan's position will 
be much stronger than their role during the Cold War era. 
Economic growth will be the main factor strengthening South Korea's 
position in dealing with unification problems and post-unification issues (i.e, 
to build up North Korea's economy to a common level). For this reason, the 
stability of Northeast Asia is a necessity for South Korea. Therefore, for 
South Korea or a unified Korea, the need for cooperation is bigger than that 
of confrontation with neighboring countries. 
It seems that it will not be so difficult for South Korea or a unified 
Korea to manage its foreign relations with the United States, China, and 
Russia compared to Japan, because of the historical legacies between the 
Koreans and the Japanese. Conversely, the necessity for cooperation with 
Japan for South Korea's national interests( or a unified Korea) is bigger than 
that of any other country. Thus, if South Korea or a unified Korea could not 
escape from the ghosts of the past in its relations with Japan, it would be 
more harmful to South Korea or a unified Korea. 
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The first requirement for good relations between any two countries is 
to see each other as they are, and to respect each other's advantage as much 
as possible. In line with this, the Korean perception of Japan and vice versa 
should shift from anatagonism to cooperation. Korea ( the South and the 
North) should recognize the value and position of Japan which has been 
outstanding in adopting advanced Western technology and systems since the 
late 19th century. Although Korea and Japan have adopted Confucionism for 
a long time, it would be better for Korea to adapt the stronger points of 
Japanese culture that are more pragmatic than that of China and Korea. 
Korea should respect Japanese achievements of economic growth and its 
efforts to restructure their society from war-like expansionism to a 
democratic pacificist society. Korea (both the South and North) would be 
better to seek its national interests as much as possible in Japan's Korea 
policy rather than just blaming Japanese policy on the Korean peninsula as 
a two Korea policy. Koreans should see Japan with the most pragmatic point 
of view, like they do other major powers. One thing is abundantly clear. 
The maintenence of peace and stability on the Korean peninsula is vital to 
Japan's security and economic interests. This means that the Japanese do not 
have valid concerns about the unification policy of a divided or unified 
86 
Korea, as long as it meets Japan's national interests-stability. 
Japan's military buildup and its military activities in UN peacekeeping 
operations should not be seen from the point of view of Korea-Japan 
bilateral relations. The United States and China have the same fear about 
Japanese military expansionism. Korea does not need to spend its national 
energy on concerning too much about Japan's military buildup. The United 
States. China, and even Russia will try to check that. The real thing for 
Koreans to worry about is not the military buildup of Japan, but cooperation 
among the four powers to control the Korean peninsula against Koreans' 
will. In any case, Japan is one of the biggest trade partners of South Korea 
and, even after unification, this situation will not change soon. 
The Japanese perception of Korea should also change for the better for 
Japan's national interests. The Japanese should highly regard the value of 
the Korean peninsula for its own security, as Hisahiko Okazaki said in his 
book, A Grand Strategy for Japaneses Defense. Okazaki asserts that 
"Japan's security is threatened when the forces of the Asian continet are not 
constrained by a principle restricting foreign expeditions and military 
conquest; and when the resistance of the Koreans collapses."206 
Moreover, the Japanese should devote their efforts to helping South and 
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North Korea achieve peaceful unification. After unification, it would be 
better for Japan to help Korea recover from its unification problems. Japan 
must not forget that Korea is not the same country it was in the late 19th 
and the early 20th centuries. It would be better for Japan's national interests 
to help Korea maintain its independence as a stable country powerful enough 
to resist any external threats rather than for Tokyo to try to control the 
Korean peninsula again. 
Here, in sum, is my conclusion on Korea-Japan relations. Unification 
is Korea's destiny and it would be better for Japan to give its full help 
toward that goal. A Korea that is unified will be strong enough to resist any 
internal or external threats. And it will be an important factor in contributing 
to the stability and prosperity of all Northeast Asia. 
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